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Abstract 
 
There are lingering concerns about the health of European banks and extensive market 
commentary about whether post-crisis regulatory reforms in Europe have adequately addressed 
these concerns.  In June 2012, European policymakers released the broad outlines of a proposal 
for a "European banking union" to strengthen the banking sector and help assuage concerns of 
investors and depositors, however, uncertainty remains regarding how the new EU bank 
resolution regime, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), will work in practice. 
This paper addresses whether the BRRD has fulfilled the requirements of the FSB Key Attributes 
for Resolution Regimes, which many take to be the gold standard bank resolution framework. 
We find that the BRRD diverges from the FSB Key Attributes or allows variation at the Member 
State level in multiple areas. The majority of these variations point to slight inconsistencies with 
the FSB recommendations. That said, some variations may have a larger impact than others. 
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Introduction 
 
In early 2010, in the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis, many European banks, burdened 
with high levels of nonperforming loans, weak capital positions, and a significant amount of 
sovereign debt, faced considerable financial strain.  In response, European policymakers 
implemented a series of financial support measures including the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), while the European Central Bank 
(ECB) announced additional measures to an already accommodative monetary policy, including 
large-scale asset purchases and provision of liquidity to the banks.  Financial conditions of the 
sovereigns and the banks continued to deteriorate over the course of 2011.   
 
In June 2012, European policymakers released the broad outlines of a proposal for a “European 
banking union” to strengthen the banking sector and help assuage concerns of investors and 
depositors, thus helping to prevent a further intensification of the crisis.  The European 
Commission, together with the ECB and the President of the European Council, put forward a 
long-term vision for a European Banking Union that would rest on three pillars supported by a 
common rule book.  The three pillars are: (1) a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM); (2) a 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM); and (3) a common deposit insurance guarantee fund 
known as the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS).1 
 
The SRM regulation established the framework for resolution of banks in the banking union and 
established the Single Resolution Board (SRB) in 2015.  Overlaying the EU bank resolution regime 
is the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which entered into force in July 2014 
and established the overarching framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions 
and investment firms in the EU.  The BRRD is a directive, and, as such, sets out an objective or 
policy to be attained but gives Member States some discretion in how that particular objective or 
policy is implemented.  
 
In the six years since the original proposal was released, much progress has been made in the 
creation of the Banking Union and further market, legal, and institutional convergence.  The SSM 
                                                            
1 The Banking Union is an institutional set-up that provides a common framework for the supervision of banks through the SSM, 
for the resolution of troubled banks and certain investment firms through the SRM, and for the availability of deposit guarantee 
schemes through the creation in due course of an EDIS for Eurozone countries participating in the Banking Union and those that 
wish to opt in.  For a general discussion of the Banking Union, see Lastra (2013) and Alexander (2015). 
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entered into force in late 2014 with the ECB assuming direct supervision of the most “significant” 
banks in the euro zone.   
 
However, recent banking stresses in Italy, Portugal and Spain demonstrate the potential financial 
stability implications when investors are uncertain about their losses in the event of a bank failure.  
It illustrates the trade-off between Member States’ flexibility to design aspects of EU policy in 
accordance with their individual jurisdictions’ legal and institutional structures and the uncertainty 
of implementation or interpretation of those laws across jurisdictions.  The experience with the 
handling of troubled banks in Italy offers a case study of issues that may arise in practice.  These 
issues are briefly considered below.  That said, a comprehensive report on the handling of failing 
banks in various Member States under the BRRD resolution framework falls beyond the scope of 
this study. 
 
It is the scope of this variation in possible implementation of the BRRD that this study explores.  
In summary, we find a large degree of consistency between the BRRD and the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) Key Attributes (KA).  We do find the potential for Member State variation in a 
number of areas, but the majority of these variations point to slight inconsistencies with the FSB 
standards.  Three noteworthy areas of variation pertain to: (a) the scope of the BRRD compared 
with the recommended scope of effective resolution regimes by the FSB Key Attributes; (b) the 
moratorium tools in the BRRD and (c) harmonization of the protection of creditors (creditor 
hierarchy) in insolvency.  That said, the November 2016 legislative proposal amending the BRRD 
(and October 2017 announcement) address the latter two areas by introducing a new moratorium 
tool and modifying creditor hierarchy in insolvency.2 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I provides an overview of the BRRD.  
Section II describes the consistency index.  Section III offers a brief overview of the FSB Key 
Attributes, which this study uses as a benchmark for assessing effectiveness.  Section IV considers 
the consistency of the BRRD to the FSB Key Attributes.  Specifically, it identifies sources of 
variation between the BRRD and the FSB Key Attributes and includes an overview of the 
implementation of the BRRD in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Greece.  Section V 
concludes with a summary and next steps.  Annex A provides a detailed analysis of the scoring, 
                                                            
2 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU on loss-absorbing and 
recapitalisation capacity of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Directive 98/26/EC, Directive 2002/47/EC, 
Directive 2012/30/EU, Directive 2011/35/EU, Directive 2005/56/EC, Directive 2004/25/EC, and Directive 2007/36/EC. 
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Annex B provides more information on the FSB Key Attributes, and Annex C discusses how the 
SRM Regulation affects consistency index scoring.  
 
I. Overview of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
 
The BRRD and the SRM Regulation stand at the epicenter of the EU bank resolution regime.3  The 
BRRD is composed of substantive legal requirements on the recovery and resolution of banks and 
large investment firms.4  These rules provide for administrative (as opposed to court-based) 
proceedings, early intervention, recovery measures and resolution tools, and a common set of 
powers for national resolution authorities.  The legal provisions of the BRRD fall under the 
following thematic areas: (a) general provisions on the subject matter, scope definitions, and 
designation of national resolution authorities; (b) preparation (recovery and resolution planning); 
(c) early intervention; (d) resolution (conditions of resolution, objectives of resolution, resolution 
tools, resolution powers, and safeguards); (e) cross-border resolution; (f) relations with third 
countries; (g) financing arrangements; (h) penalties and other miscellaneous provisions (powers 
of execution, amendments to Directives, final provisions that inter alia refer to the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) Resolution Committee, and an Annex).  The BRRD applies to all 28 
Member States and thus regulates bank resolution both within and outside the Banking Union.5  
As of November 2016 two amendments have been proposed to the BRRD: The introduction of a 
pre-resolution moratorium and amendments to the insolvency ranking of creditors. 
 
Overlaying the BRRD is a complex institutional architecture through which bank resolution is put 
into operation.  This institutional architecture consists of two partially overlapping spheres of 
public governance.  Within the Banking Union, the SRM Regulation constitutes the foundation of 
the SRM—a quasi-centralized system of decision making for the resolution of banks authorized in 
                                                            
3 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery 
and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190), henceforth referred to as the BRRD. For 
a general commentary on the BRRD, see Binder and Singh (2016); and Hu (2015). Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of 
credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund 
and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 SRM Regulation (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1), henceforth referred to as the ‘Single 
Resolution Mechanism Regulation’ or ‘SRMR’. 
4 Specifically, the BRRD applies only to credit institutions, as these are defined under the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRR) (that is, banks and certain other deposit takers), parent undertakings including financial holding companies and mixed 
financial holding companies that are subject to consolidated supervision of the ECB under the SSM, and investment firms and 
financial institutions when covered by consolidated supervision of the parent undertaking under the CRR. The resolution of 
insurance firms and central counterparties (CCPs) is not covered.  See BRRD Article 1(1).  As of November 2016, two 
amendments have been proposed to the BRRD:  The introduction of a pre-resolution moratorium and amendments to the 
insolvency ranking of creditors 
5 The Banking Union is composed of the 19 euro-area countries plus any non-euro-area European Union Member States that opt 
into the Banking Union. To date, only Eurozone countries participate in the Banking Union. 
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Eurozone countries under the leadership of the SRB.6  Outside the Banking Union, the BRRD 
establishes a more decentralized system of bank resolution.  Under the BRRD, bank resolution 
remains in the hands of national resolution authorities, but any actions taken by national resolution 
authorities are monitored, supervised, and, where appropriate, coordinated by the EBA.   
 
Two questions related to the scope of variation inherent in the EU legal framework of bank 
resolution arise.  First, is the EU legal framework effective in meeting the objectives of a well-
designed resolution framework?  And, second, is the EU legal framework robust enough so that, 
when put into practice, the national discretion built into the framework does not lead to deviations 
that could undermine its effectiveness?  In other words, does the BRRD allow discretion that could 
potentially lead to either (1) uncertainty in execution or enforcement that may, in turn, result in 
greater financial stability risks or (2) implementation that results in financial-sector fragmentation 
rather than the promotion of international harmonization of financial regulations? 
 
We address these two questions in our study.  Assessing whether the BRRD is a well-designed 
resolution regime requires a benchmark of “effectiveness.”  Here we draw on work by the FSB 
and, in particular, the FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial 
Institutions 2014 (“Key Attributes”). The Key Attributes “set out the core elements that the 
FSB considers to be necessary for an effective resolution regime.  Their implementation should 
allow authorities to resolve financial institutions in an orderly manner without taxpayer exposure 
to loss from solvency support, while maintaining continuity of their vital economic functions” 
(FSB 2014).  These mechanisms should internalize costs so that losses are absorbed by shareholders 
and unsecured and uninsured creditors in a manner that respects the hierarchy of claims in 
liquidation.  
 
Our examination of Member States’ implementation of the BRRD for variation across borders and 
consistency to the Key Attributes is quite narrow.  Due to the complexity of this exercise, we look 
at four Member States: Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Greece.  Put simply, our exercise 
is to map the BRRD to the Key Attributes and then map the individual Member States’ 
implementation to the BRRD.  
                                                            
6 The SRB is an EU agency with a special resolution mandate for the purposes of the SRM, but it is ‘Single’ only by name. The 
Commission, the Council, and the ECB are also involved in decisions and actions.  The SRM operates under the leadership of 
SRB Article 7(1) SRM Regulation (stipulating that the SRB is responsible for the effective and consistent functioning of the 
SRM).  The SRB is directly responsible for the resolution of systemically significant banks (and investment firms) (SRMR 
Articles 5(1) and 7(2)).  The national resolution authorities are directly responsible for the resolution of all other banks and 
investment firms— namely, small- and medium-sized domestic entities subject to certain exceptions such as, for example, when 
the Single Resolution Fund is to be used (SRMR Article 7(3)).  For a general discussion, see Georgosouli, (2016). 
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The examination of the legal framework and the policies governing the resolution regime of the 
BRRD and in four Member States is similar, in part, to the ongoing work in the FSB (2016). 
However, our work is different from the work done at the FSB in three ways.  First, we examine 
whether the BRRD is in line with the FSB’s Key Attributes.  To our knowledge, the FSB peer 
reviews have examined six Members States’ implementation of their resolution regime and have 
not assessed the consistency with the BRRD directly.  The BRRD deserves special consideration 
in its own right, however, as it is the only quasi-supranational legal vehicle in Europe through 
which international standards of bank resolution are transposed into domestic law and the only 
legal instrument dedicated to regional convergence of laws of EU Member States.  Second, we 
examine all of the FSB attributes, whereas the recent FSB peer review examined three key 
attributes.  Third, we create a quantitative method, or index, by which to assess consistency and 
cross-border variation.  The quantification of the Member States’ consistency with the key 
attributes and eventual extension of our method to other countries will allow cross-country 
comparison of resolution regimes at a level that has not been previously possible.  While the FSB 
adopts a four-grade assessment scale ((a) compliant, (b) largely compliant, (c) materially non-
compliant, and (d) non-compliant), the goal of the assessment is to focus the attention of the 
authorities on areas that need improvements and to suggest an Action Plan.  Our aim is to create a 
mechanism by which countries’ resolution regimes can be assessed quantitatively.  In making 
assessments, we are moving from the FSBs qualitative four-point scale to a continuous index that 
ranges from 0 to 1.  
 
II. The Consistency Index 
 
To construct our index, we compare the text of the FSB Key Attributes of 2014 with the text of 
the BRRD, focusing, in particular, on the Article of the BRRD that we find to have the closest 
relevance to the Key Attribute in question, taking into account its title, content, and overall place 
in the text of the Directive.  First, we check for absolute literal consistency.  Where there are 
differences in the language used, we proceed to investigate whether these differences point to 
actual variations between the FSB Key Attribute in question and the relevant BRRD Article or, 
alternatively, whether they can be attributed to the use of different terminology, structural, or other 
technical features of the two legal instruments.  To this end, we interpret the Article of the Directive 
with the closest relevance to the Key Attribute under examination in light of other relevant BRRD 
provisions and recitals of the Preamble to the Directive as well as other primary and secondary 
legal sources, where appropriate.  We do the same with our comparison to the BRRD and our 
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sample of national legislations in order to offer a preliminary assessment of the implementation of 
the FSB Key Attributes in individual Member States.  Finally, we measure the impact of the SRM 
Regulation on the level of consistency with the EU legal framework of bank resolution to the FSB 
Key Attributes within the Banking Union. 
 
We build our index by examining every item in the Key Attributes alongside the BRRD.  There 
are 12 Key Attributes, each of which has multiple individual elements.  For each element, we 
assign a value of 0, 0.5, or 1 to the BRRD depending on its consistency with the Key Attributes.  
If the BRRD fully complies with the element in the Key Attribute, then it is assigned a value of 1.  
If it does not comply at all or is absent (not mentioned), then it is assigned a value of 0.  If it 
partially adheres, then it is assigned a value of 0.5.  For each Key Attribute, we sum the assigned 
numbers (0, 0.5, 1) over all elements and then divide by the number of elements in that Key 
Attribute.  Note that when there are sub-elements of elements within a Key Attribute, we average 
across the sub-elements to obtain the score for each element before averaging across the elements 
of a Key Attribute.  We do this for all 12 Key Attributes and then average the individual Key 
Attribute scores over all Key Attributes.  While this method allows for cross-country comparison 
when other jurisdictions are added to our sample, it has three drawbacks: (1) it is very labor 
intensive; (2) some subjectivity is unavoidable since we must make a judgment on those items that 
do not clearly adhere to the entire element; and (3) we take simple averages across all elements of 
the Key Attributes and then across all the 12 Key Attributes and which equally weights all 
elements.  We acknowledge that some elements may be more important than others and, therefore, 
deserve greater weight.  However, it is difficult to make judgments on which of the Key Attributes 
(or their elements) are more or less important than the others, and their relative importance may 
vary by jurisdiction.  Finally, we examine the consistency of the BRRD to the FSB Key Attributes, 
also taking into account the impact of the SRM Regulation in the case of Eurozone Member States 
participating in the Banking Union.  Of course, any full assessment of the implementation of the 
FSB Key Attributes in the EU involves examination of other EU legal instruments—for example, 
EBA technical and implementing standards and guidelines as well as relevant national legislation.   
 
III. The FSB’s Key Attributes as a Benchmark for Assessing Effectiveness 
 
This section describes the FSB’s Key Attributes in detail and draws directly from the 2014 
publication.  More information on the Key Attributes is in Annex B. 
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“The Key Attributes set out the core elements that the FSB considers to be necessary for 
an effective resolution regime.  Their implementation should allow authorities to resolve 
financial institutions in an orderly manner without taxpayer exposure to loss from solvency 
support, while maintaining continuity of their vital economic functions.  The Key Attributes 
set out twelve essential features that should be part of the resolution regimes of all 
jurisdictions.  They relate to: 
 
1. Scope 
2. Resolution authority 
3. Resolution powers 
4. Set-off, netting, collateralization, segregation of client assets 
5. Safeguards 
6. Funding of firms in resolution 
7. Legal framework conditions for cross-border cooperation 
8. Crisis Management Groups (CMGs) 
9. Institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements 
10. Resolvability assessments 
11. Recovery and resolution planning 
12. Access to information and information sharing.” 
 
As the internationally agreed-upon principles that were developed by subject matter experts and 
rigorously vetted by member countries, we take the FSB Key Attributes to be the standard by 
which countries should model and judge their individual resolution regimes.  We build our analysis 
on this assumption.  It may be possible that the Key Attributes are missing some fundamental 
elements or that any one of the Key Attributes is not complete.  To the extent that the FSB Key 
Attributes have shortcomings, our study falls short.   
 
IV. Variations Between EU Legal Framework of Bank Resolution and FSB Key 
Attributes 
 
Part 1. Sources of Variation 
 
Variations between the FSB Key Attributes and the BRRD may be attributed to the following five 
factors: (1) the scope of the BRRD; (2) the open-ended language of the FSB Key Attributes; (3) 
the fact that certain aspects of bank resolution are not explicitly dealt with in the FSB Key 
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Attributes; (4) the global orientation of the FSB Key Attributes compared with the European focus 
of the BRRD; and (5) the fact that the FSB Key Attributes and the BRRD serve different 
purposes—while the FSB Key Attributes were designed to lay out best standards of practice in 
bank recovery and resolution, the BRRD serves to attain an adequate level of harmonization of 
bank resolution in the EU (including the Banking Union), mirroring, where practicable, the FSB 
standards.  
 
Variation is expected between the BRRD and national resolution frameworks due to inter alia: (1) 
the scope of application of the Directive; (2) the distinction between systemic and less-systemic 
banks for the purposes of allocating responsibilities between the SRB and the national resolution 
authorities in the SRM; (3) the complementarity of the BRRD with legal frameworks whose 
harmonization is limited; and (4) the provision of national options and discretions in the BRRD.7  
These variations raise potential concerns with regard to the effective implementation of the FSB 
Key Attributes in the EU.  For example, some BRRD rules provide for discretion or variation in 
implementation while, at the same time, describing a uniform set of legal principles that national 
resolution authorities must take into account.  These legal principles—descriptions of criteria, 
conditions, or circumstances—nevertheless guide evaluative judgments and confine the range of 
available options for national resolution authorities.  EBA technical and implementing standards 
and EBA guidelines also impact how far national resolution authorities can go in exercising 
discretion.  Taken together, they provide some constraints on Member States and national 
resolution authorities’ use of discretion.8 
 
Furthermore, there are several issues about which the FSB Key Attributes are open-ended or silent.  
For example, the FSB Key Attributes do not specify who is to make determinations with regard to 
events that may trigger entry into resolution. BRRD Article 32(2) states that such determinations 
are to be made either by the competent authority (typically the supervisory authority) or by the 
resolution authority after consulting with the competent authority.  In view of this, the analysis 
below focuses on variations that, in our opinion, are liable to raise concerns with regard to the 
effective implementation of the FSB Key Attributes in the EU at the regional level. 
 
                                                            
7 For a comprehensive overview of national options provided in the BRRD, see Linter (2015). 
8 The EBA monitors consistency, although how far the EBA can actually go in enforcing convergence is an open question.  The 
EBA is responsible for the consistent application of the Rulebook in all 28 Member States including those participating in the 
Banking Union.  To this end, Article 17 of EBA Regulation endows the EBA with quasi-investigatory and enforcement powers. 
Contrary to the EBA, the SRB is also empowered to impose direct sanctions, albeit in very limited circumstances.  For a more 
detailed discussion, see Georgosouli (2016). 
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Part 2. Variations Between FSB Key Attributes and the BRRD 
(a) Implementation of KA 1 (scope)
Key Attribute 1 outlines the required scope, or expanse, of an effective resolution regime.  The 
BRRD fully adheres to 4 of the 7 elements of Key Attribute 1 and partially adheres to 2 of the 
elements, leading to a BRRD consistency score of 0.56.  This score was lowered by the BRRD’s 
narrow focus on credit institutions and certain investment firms.  In particular, Key Attribute 1 
states that Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs) should be subject to the resolution regime, but 
the BRRD does not apply to FMIs, which led to a score of 0 for that component of Key Attribute 
1. The legal text of the BRRD also does not make reference to “non-regulated entities within a
financial group or conglomerate,” which the Key Attributes state should be included.  Lastly,
according to the Key Attributes, all domestically incorporated Global Systemically Important
Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) should be subject to institution-specific cross-border cooperation
agreements as further outlined in Key Attribute 9.  As we discuss in more detail below, although
bank resolution is expected to be “institution-specific” where appropriate, it is not legally
mandatory under the BRRD to enter into institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements.
(b) Implementation of KA 2 (designation of resolution authority)
Key Attribute 2 requires a resolution authority and outlines the objectives and boundaries of the 
resolution authority(ies).  The BRRD fully adheres to 8 of the 11 elements of Key Attribute 2 and 
partially adheres to the remaining 3 elements which yields an overall Key Attribute 2 score of 0.81, 
higher than Key Attribute 1.  Key Attribute 2 does not recommend a specific institutional design 
for the resolution authority.  Rather, countries are free to choose their preferred level of 
institutional integration when designating a single resolution authority or establishing multiple 
resolution authorities.  However, in the case of a multi-tiered structure, the respective mandates, 
roles, and responsibilities of the resolution authorities must be clearly defined and be consistent 
with all other recommendations of the FSB.  The FSB’s approach to the institutional design of 
resolution authorities accepts that the institutional features of resolution authorities are bound to 
be context-dependent.  The BRRD, however, introduces a slight deviation from Key Attribute 2, 
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leading to this component scoring a 0.5 instead of a 1, insofar as the letter of the Directive conveys 
a clear preference for a single resolution authority subject to exceptions.9 
 
BRRD Article 3(12) also makes a special provision for the legal protection of resolution authorities 
and their respective staff.10  But while the Key Attributes require that “the resolution authority and 
its staff should be protected against liability for actions taken and omissions made while 
discharging their duties in the exercise of resolution powers in good faith,” the BRRD only states 
that “Member States may limit the liability of the resolution authority … in accordance with 
national law for acts and omissions in the course of discharging their functions under this 
Directive.”  The permissiveness of the BRRD language relative to the Key Attributes led to this 
component receiving a score of 0.5.  
 
Finally, Key Attribute 2 states that resolution authorities “should have unimpeded access to firms 
… for the purposes of resolution planning and the preparation and implementation of resolution 
measures.”  Although the BRRD does not use the phrase “unimpeded access to firms,” it does 
mandate that Member States shall make sure that resolution authorities have the powers to require 
the provision of “all of the information necessary” to draw up and implement resolution plans and 
that resolution authorities can request information from the bank either directly or through “the 
competent authority” (e.g., prudential supervisor in the case of a bank).  We interpret Key Attribute 
2 to favour direct access to information, so asking a resolution authority to obtain information 
through a competent authority can be seen as an unnecessary procedural formality that can 
potentially be obstructive to the timely planning, preparation, and implementation of the 
resolution.  For this reason, we scored this component of Key Attribute 2 at 0.5.  
 
                                                            
9 Specifically, BRRD Article 3(1) requires Member States “to designate one or, exceptionally, more resolution authorities that are 
empowered to apply the resolution tools and exercise the resolution powers.”  Under the BRRD, it is legally mandatory for 
Member States to ensure that resolution authorities are “public administrative authorities” or “authorities entrusted with public 
administrative tasks.”9  While the BRRD does not impose a specifically detailed design of the national resolution authority as this 
would interfere with the constitutional and administrative systems of Member States, the BRRD does mandate operational 
independence and mechanisms to be in place for the management of conflicts of interest.  This is consistent with KA 2, although 
KA 2.5 seems to suggest that the relevant provisions of the BRRD should have been more detailed in describing the institutional 
features of national resolution authorities. 
10 Resolution authorities and staff are not immune from judicial review.  Any limitations to liability come without prejudice to the 
right to appeal against a decision on crisis prevention and management.  The lodge of judicial review does not automatically 
suspend the effect of the challenged decision. See BRRD Article 3(12) and BRRD Article 85(2)-(3). 
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(c) Implementation of KA 3 (resolution powers)  
 
Key Attribute 3 denotes the powers of the resolution authority described in Key Attribute 2.  The 
BRRD fully adheres to 27 of the 32 elements of Key Attribute 3 and partially adheres to another 
2 elements.  We score BRRD’s consistency with Key Attribute 3 at 0.88. 
 
Key Attribute 3 offers a detailed description of the general resolution powers.  One such power is 
that resolution authorities should have the power to “remove and replace the senior management 
and directors and recover monies from responsible persons, including claw-back of variable 
remuneration.”  Under the BRRD, resolution authorities are empowered to remove or replace the 
management body and senior management of an institution under resolution.  However, the BRRD 
does not specify whether this power also includes the power to recover (claw back) variable 
remunerations that open the door to discretion across Member States and led to a score of 0.5 for 
this component of Key Attribute 3.   
 
Key Attribute 3 also gives resolution authorities the power to “impose a moratorium with a 
suspension of payments to unsecured creditors and customers (except for payments and property 
transfers to central counterparties (CCPs) and those entered into payment, clearing and settlement 
systems) and a stay on creditor actions to attach assets or otherwise collect money or property from 
the firm, while protecting the enforcement of eligible netting and collateral agreements.”  
However, BRRD Article 69 does not make explicit reference to the power to impose a temporary 
moratorium on the payment of claims.11  It does, however, equip resolution authorities with the 
power to “suspend certain obligations.”  The current moratorium tools in the BRRD do not provide 
as much [power] to the authorities as the Key Attribute and also allow scope for differing treatment 
of institutions in early intervention and therefore uncertainty, which led to a score of 0.5 for this 
component of Key Attribute 3.  Note that the European Commission is reviewing modifications to 
the moratorium. 
 
The remaining deviations from Key Attribute 3 in the BRRD are related to limitations to the scope 
of the BRRD.  In particular, several elements of Key Attribute 3 related to the resolution of 
insurance companies were scored a 0.  As most of the impact of the overall score came from issues 
                                                            
11 However, see Recital 89 of the preamble to the BRRD, which states that resolution authorities should have ‘the power to 
impose temporary moratorium on the payment of claims.’ 
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outside of the scope of the BRRD, we view the BRRD to be nearly compliant with Key Attribute 
3. 
 
(d) Implementation of KA 4 (set-off, netting, collateralization, segregation of client 
assets) 
 
Key Attribute 4 outlines the framework governing set-off rights, contractual netting and 
collateralization agreements, and the segregation of client assets in case of a resolution.  The 
BRRD fully adheres to 2 of the 6 elements and partially adheres to the remaining elements for a 
score of 0.75 on this Key Attribute. 
 
The deductions in this Key Attribute are largely due to linguistic differences between the two texts 
rather than pure omissions.  For example, with respect to contractual acceleration or early 
termination rights, Key Attribute 4 equips resolution authorities with the power “to stay 
temporarily such rights.”  Key Attribute 4 further specifies that the stay may be automatic or 
subject to the discretion of the resolution authority and that in either case, countries should ensure 
that there is clarity as to the beginning and the end of the stay.  While BRRD Article 71 is broadly 
in line with this part of the Key Attribute, paragraph 3 of Article 71 reads: “Any suspension under 
paragraph 1 or 2 shall not apply to systems or operators of systems designated for the purposes of 
the Directive 98/26/EC, central counterparties or central banks.”   
 
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 71 also provide an exception where a person may exercise a 
termination right under a contract before the end of the suspension period if that person receives 
notice from the resolution authority that the rights and liabilities covered by the contract shall not 
be transferred to another entity or shall not be subject to write-down or conversion on the 
application of the bail-in tool.  The introduction of this exception may have some unintended 
consequences in practice.  Specifically, it raises the question as to the exact point of time when 
there is a legal obligation for the resolution authority to communicate its intention (e.g., the 
intention to transfer or not to transfer certain rights and liabilities), and it suggests that this point 
of time may well be in advance of exercising the power of temporary suspension.  This procedural 
ambiguity could provide grounds for the judicial review of decisions taken by the resolution 
authorities.  We therefore assign a score of 0.5 for several components of this Key Attribute, which 
gives a final Key Attribute 4 score of 0.75. 
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(e) Implementation of KA 5 (safeguards) 
 
According to our analysis, the BRRD fully adheres to all 6 elements of Key Attribute 5 and thus 
scores a 1.00 overall. 
 
(f) Implementation of KA 6 (funding of firms in resolution)  
 
Key Attribute 6 lays out the policies and institutions that should be in place to ensure proper 
funding of a firm in resolution.  There is broad consistency between the BRRD and the 6 elements 
of Key Attribute 6, with two notable exceptions.  The first is that the BRRD regulates the provision 
of public funding outside resolution, the second is that the BRRD does not explicitly allow 
recovery of losses outside reasonable expenses.  This yields an overall score of 0.8 for Key 
Attribute 6.   
 
In addition to the provision of public funding in resolution, the BRRD regulates the provision of 
public funding outside resolution, while Key Attribute 6 is silent on the topic.  Specifically, 
precautionary recapitalisation may be allowed under the BRRD where a solvent bank fails to raise 
capital privately following a stress test due to a temporary liquidity shortage and its failure would 
be a risk to financial stability.  Public financial support outside resolution can take various forms 
(e.g., a State guarantee to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks) and is seen as a 
temporary measure.  It is conditional on final approval under the EU State aid framework.  
Moreover, the term “precautionary” denotes the forward-looking nature of the measure and implies 
that it is not to be used to offset losses that the troubled financial firm has incurred or is likely to 
incur in the near future.12 
 
Where resolution authorities are equipped with the power to place a distressed bank under 
temporary public ownership and control, Key Attribute 6 provides that there should be a provision 
to recover any losses incurred by the state.  These losses are to be recovered “from unsecured 
creditors or, if necessary, the financial system more widely.”  According to BRRD Article 37(7), 
a national resolution authority (and any financial arrangement acting pursuant to Article 101 of the 
BRRD) is entitled to recover reasonable expenses in one or more of the following ways:  
 
                                                            
12 For a more detailed discussion, see: Olivares-Caminal and Russo (2017) and Georgosouli (2018). 
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(a) as a deduction from any consideration paid by a recipient to the institution under resolution 
or, as the case may be, to the owners of the shares or other instruments of ownership;  
(b) from the institution under resolution, as a preferred creditor; 
(c) from any proceeds generated as a result of the termination of the operation of the bridge 
institution or the asset management vehicle, as a preferred creditor.13  
 
But the lack of explicit reference to any entitlement to “recover losses” more generally suggests 
departure from Key Attribute 6 as long as the Key Attributes’ reference to “losses” can be 
interpreted as covering other losses in addition to losses incurred out of “reasonable expenses.”  
We therefore scored this component of Key Attribute 6 a 0.5 for an overall score of 0.8 for the 
Key Attribute as a whole. 
 
(g) Implementation of KA 7 (legal framework conditions of cross-border 
cooperation) 
 
Key Attribute 7 sets out the legal framework conditions for cross-border cooperation.  The BRRD 
broadly adheres to Key Attribute 7, with an overall score of 0.93.  The BRRD fully adheres to 6 
of the 7 elements of Key Attribute 7 and partially adheres to the remaining element.   
  
The main deviation between Key Attribute 7 and the BRRD relates to whether national laws and 
regulations discriminate against creditors on the basis of their nationality, the location of their 
claim, or the jurisdiction where it is payable, which, according to Key Attribute 7, it should.  
Recital (13) of the Preamble to the BRRD clearly communicates the commitment of the EU 
legislator that, with regard to treatment and ranking of claims in insolvency, creditors are not 
discriminated against on the basis of their nationality.  In this spirit, BRRD Article 108 harmonizes 
the ranking of deposits in insolvency hierarchy to preempt instances of undue discrimination.  The 
FSB refers to “creditors” in general, including, but not limited to, the group of creditors specified 
in Article 108 (e.g., secured depositors).  The minimum harmonization of the protection of 
creditors attained in BRRD falls somewhat short of the level of harmonization contained in Key 
Attribute 7, and we thus score this component of Key Attribute 7 a 0.5.  Key Attribute 7 further 
recommends that the treatment of creditors and ranking in insolvency is transparent and properly 
disclosed to depositors, insurance policyholders, and other creditors.  The November 2016 
                                                            
13 This relates to expenses in connection to the use of any resolutions or powers or government stabilization tools.  The same 
holds for resolution authorities. 
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legislative proposal amending the BRRD would address the harmonization of creditor hierarchy 
by introducing a new statutory category of non-preferred senior debt. 
 
(h) Implementation of KA 8 (crisis management groups) and KA 9 (institution-
specific cross-border cooperation agreements) 
 
In view of the pivotal role that Crisis Management Groups (CMGs) could play in cross-border 
resolution, consistency between the BRRD and Key Attribute 8 is discussed jointly with Key 
Attribute 9 (institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements).  While there is some 
consistency with Key Attribute 8—the BRRD only partially adheres to 2 of the 4 elements of Key 
Attribute 8—consistency with Key Attribute 9 is higher—the BRRD fully adheres to 6 of the 11 
elements of Key Attribute 9 and partially adheres to the remaining elements, suggesting that the 
BRRD enables credible cross-border cooperation among resolution authorities. 
 
According to Key Attribute 8, CMGs should keep under active review and report as appropriate 
to the FSB and the FSB Peer Review Council on a number of critical elements.14  But BRRD 
Article 97(5) only states that “Cooperation arrangements concluded between resolution authorities 
of Member States and third countries in accordance with this Article may include provisions on 
the following matters: [...] (f) procedures and arrangements for the exchange of information and 
cooperation under points (a) to (e), including, where appropriate, through the establishment and 
operation of crisis management groups.” From this provision, it follows that the BRRD 
acknowledges the role of CMGs in the resolution of G-SIFIs, but it does not specify the tasks and 
role of the CMGs.  Rather, it is understood that, in due course, international agreements will set 
out details of the operation of CMGs.  Pending the conclusion of these international agreements, 
European Resolution Colleges are expected to function like CMGs.15  The BRRD does not impose 
any reporting requirements to the FSB and the FSB Peer Review Council (FSB Resolvability 
Assessment Process for the time being), however, and thus the scores for all of the components of 
Key Attribute 8 were lowered, providing an overall score of 0.33. 
 
                                                            
14 These elements include (i) progress in coordination and information sharing with the CMGs and with host authorities that are 
not represented in the CMGs, (ii) the recovery and resolution planning process for G-SIFIs under institution-specific cooperation 
agreements, and (iii) the resolvability of G-SIFIs.   
15 The BRRD draws a distinction between the resolution colleges of Article 88, which facilitate the cross-border resolution of 
groups in the EU, and the resolution colleges named as “European Resolution Colleges” of Article 89, which are formed in order 
to facilitate the cross-border resolution of subsidiaries and branches of third-country financial institutions that are considered of 
systemic significance in more than one Member State. 
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Key Attribute 9 stipulates that these cooperation agreements should, for example, “establish the 
objectives and processes for cooperation through CMGs,” but, as discussed above, the BRRD does 
not specify the tasks and role of the CMGs; thus, this component of Key Attribute 9 was scored a 
0.5.  But more broadly, BRRD Article 97(3) stipulates that the EBA may conclude “non-binding 
framework cooperation arrangements” with third countries.  
 
The BRRD is generally in line with Key Attribute 9, with a score of 0.88.  However, the soft law 
nature of the arrangements pending the conclusion of legally binding international agreements 
creates uncertainty.  The BRRD regulates the content of the agreement with third countries and 
the content of the non-binding cooperation arrangements only in broad terms, leaving the details 
to be decided on an ad hoc basis and potentially in a manner that may not align to the 
recommendations of the FSB.  For example, BRRD Article 97(3) mandates that the content of 
non-binding cooperation arrangements shall establish processes and arrangements for inter alia 
information sharing and cooperation.  In a similar fashion, the Directive sets out a non-exhaustive 
list of tasks and powers, but, at the same time, it states that the cooperation framework can include 
some or all of those tasks and powers in the list.  As such, several other components of Key 
Attribute 9 have also been scored a 0.5, as the BRRD does not provide specific guidance for each 
specific condition of Key Attribute 9. 
 
(i) Implementation of KA 10 (resolvability assessments) 
 
According to our analysis, the BRRD fully adheres to the 8 elements of Key Attribute 10 and thus 
scores a 1.00 overall. 
 
(j) Implementation of KA 11 (recovery and resolution planning)  
 
Key Attribute 11 governs processes with regard to recovery and resolution planning.  The BRRD 
adheres closely to Key Attribute 11 with an overall score of 0.88.  The BRRD fully adheres to 14 
of the 19 elements of Key Attribute 11 and partially adheres to 3 more elements. 
 
Broadly speaking, Key Attribute 10 (resolvability assessments), Key Attribute 11 (recovery and 
resolution planning), and certain aspects of Key Attribute 3 (resolution powers) are mirrored in 
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the early intervention rules provided in the BRRD.16  The BRRD’s rules on preparation and early 
intervention leave considerable discretion to national resolution authorities subject to EBA 
regulatory technical standards, implementation standards, and guidelines.  For example, resolution 
authorities determine the contents and details of recovery and resolution plans, the date by which 
the first recovery and resolution plans are to be drawn up, and the frequency for updating them.17 
 
With regard to the content of the resolution plan, Key Attribute 11 recommends inter alia that the 
resolution plan must include a substantive resolution strategy and an operational plan for its 
implementation and identification.18  BRRD Article 10(7) is broadly in compliance with KA 11.6; 
however, there are some notable points of deviation.  For example, Article 10(7) (j) prescribes that 
a resolution plan must contain a detailed description of the different resolution strategies that could 
be applied according to the different possible scenarios and the applicable timescales.  However, 
it makes no explicit reference to (a) “actions to protect insured depositors and insurance 
policyholders” or (b) actions that “ensure the rapid return of segregated client access,” leading us 
to score these components of Key Attribute 11 as 0.5.  It also does not provide for “options or 
principles for the exit from the resolution process,” which we therefore score as 0.  
 
Key Attribute 11 additionally requires regular updates and reviews of recovery and resolution 
plans.  In particular, recovery and resolution plans must be updated at least annually or when 
material changes to a firm’s business or structure and, in the case of G-SIFIs, be subject to regular 
reviews within the firm’s CMGs.  Key Attribute 11 further recommends that, with respect to G-
SIFIs, the review should involve the firm’s CEO.  BRRD Article 5(2) (recovery plans) and BRRD 
Article 10(6) (resolution plans) comply with these recommendations.  With regard to the resolution 
of G-SIFIs, the BRRD adheres to the FSB standards, albeit subject to the observations made above 
with respect to the implementation of KA 8 (CMGs).  A further point of deviation concerns the 
involvement of the CEOs of G-SIFIs.  Arguably, this may be inferred in the case of resolution 
plans.19  However, it is far less evident in the case of recovery plans.   
                                                            
16 For example, one of the early intervention powers provided in the BRRD is the appointment of a temporary administrator.  The 
purpose of this appointment is to restore the viability of the distressed bank—namely, it is a recovery measure.  The FSB 
classifies this as a ‘general resolution power(s)’ (KA 3.2. (ii)).  
17 BRRD Article 5. 
18 According to Key Attribute 11, the resolution plans must include “(i) financial and economic functions for which continuity is 
critical; (ii) suitable resolution options to preserve those functions or wind them down in and orderly manner; (iii) data 
requirements on the firm’s business operations, structures, and systemically important functions; (iv) potential barriers to 
effective resolution and actions to mitigate those barriers; (v) actions to protect insured depositors and insurance policyholders 
and ensure the rapid return of segregated client assets; and (vi) clear options or principles for the exit from the resolution 
process.” 
19 With regard to the review and updates of resolution plans, see BRRD Article 10 (7) (r), according to which the resolution plan 
must, where applicable, include ‘any opinion expressed by the institution in relation to the resolution plan.’ 
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(k) Implementation of KA 12 (access to information and information sharing) 
 
Key Attribute 12 aims to ensure seamless information sharing between supervisory authorities, 
central banks, resolution authorities, finance ministries, and the public authorities responsible for 
guarantee schemes.  The BRRD adheres closely to Key Attribute 12 with an overall score of 0.92.  
The deviation of 1 of the 7 total elements of Key Attribute 12 is due to some degree of ambiguity 
in the BRRD with regard to the procedures for sharing information in the institution-specific 
cooperation agreements.  This ambiguity led us to score this one component of Key Attribute 12 a 
0.5. 
 
Part 3. The Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation and its Impact on the Findings of the 
Consistency Index 
 
Alone, the BRRD provides a partially harmonized legal framework for the recovery and resolution 
of banks and certain investment firms, but, as detailed above, it leaves ample discretion to national 
resolution authorities, especially in the application of the tools and in the use of national financing 
arrangements.  Consequently, neither the risk of taking separate and inconsistent decisions is 
avoided nor the dependence of banks on the support of national financing arrangements is 
sufficiently reduced.  Within the Banking Union, these risks are, in part, mitigated with the SRM 
Regulation.  The SRM Regulation provides the legal framework for the operation of the SRM, 
which is expected to enhance legal uniformity and consistency in the application of the resolution 
rules of the BRRD in participating Eurozone countries (Georgosouli 2016, 354-355). 
 
The SRM applies only with respect to banks whose home supervisor is the ECB either by virtue 
of being in the euro area or by opting into supervision by the ECB.  The SRB is an EU-level agency 
with a special resolution mandate.20  National resolution authorities are also involved in bank 
resolution; however, their involvement is much more pronounced in the resolution of “less 
systemic banks.”  The latter are typically small- and medium-sized banks of domestic interest.  The 
SRM Regulation also makes provision for a Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which will eventually 
replace the existing national resolution funds and be administered by the SRB.21 
                                                            
20 The SRB is an EU agency with a special resolution mandate for the purposes of the SRM.  See SRM Regulation Article 42(1). 
21 The SRM Regulation and the BRRD set out rules for the use of the SRF as well as general criteria to determine ex-post and ex-
ante contributions.  An Inter-Governmental Agreement specifies the conditions upon which participating Member States agree to 
transfer the contributions that they raise at the national level to the SRF and to progressively merge the national compartments.  
See SRM Regulation Article 67 (general provisions), 68 (requirement to establish resolution financing arrangements), Article 69 
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According to the findings of this study, the entry into force of the SRM Regulation has no (or 
negligible) impact on the level of regional consistency with regard to KA 1 (scope), KA 4 (set-off, 
netting, collateralization, and segregation of client assets), KA 5 (safeguards), KA 6 (funding of 
firms in resolution), KA 10 (resolvability assessments), and KA 11 (recovery and resolution 
planning).  
 
By contrast, it enhances the scoring of Eurozone consistency with regard to the implementation of 
KA 2 (designation of resolution authority), KA 3 (resolution powers), KA 7 (legal framework 
conditions for cross-border cooperation), KA 8 (CMGs), KA 9 (institution-specific cooperation 
agreements), and KA 12 (access to information and information sharing).  More detail on the 
specific manner in which the SRM Regulation enhances consistency may be found in Annex C. 
 
Part 4. The Transposition of the BRRD in the National Law of Member States: The Case of 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece, and Italy 
 
Below, we examine four countries (Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Greece) to assess 
the convergence of domestic law with the BRRD.  All four countries had in place a legal 
framework on bank resolution prior to the transposition of the BRRD.  Germany, Greece, and Italy 
are participating Member States in the Banking Union; the United Kingdom is not.  This section 
does not offer an extensive overview of the domestic law on bank resolution of those countries.  
Instead, it offers a preliminary assessment of the actual level of convergence, highlighting key 
points of departure where relevant. 
 
(a) Germany 
 
As a Eurozone country, Germany participates in the Banking Union and the SRM.  Germany 
adopted the BRRD Implementation Act (BRRD–Umsetzungsgesetz) (the Act) in December 2014.  
                                                            
(target level), Article 70 (ex-ante contributions), Article 71 (extra ordinary ex-post contributions), Article 72 (voluntary borrowing 
between resolution financing arrangements), Article 73 (alternative funding means), Article 74 (access to financial stability), Article 
75 (administration of the fund), Article 76 (mission of the fund), Article 77 (use of the fund), Article 78 (mutualization of national 
financial arrangements in the case of group resolution involving institutions in non-participating Member States), and Article 79 
(use of deposit guarantee schemes in the context of resolution).  The establishment of resolution financing arrangements at the 
Member State level is set out in Article 99 to 109 of the BRRD.  On the content of the Inter-Governmental Agreement, see European 
Commission, ‘A Single Resolution Mechanism for the Banking Union – frequently asked questions’ Memo 14/295 (Brussels, 15, 
April 2014). 
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In late September, the German Parliament made a number of revisions to the Act.  Germany was 
the first EU country to transpose the BRRD into national law and covers credit institutions and 
investment firms in Germany.  This also includes German credit institutions and investment firms 
that are part of a group.  The Act entered into force on January 1, 2015, and amended a number of 
statutes, including the German Banking Act, the Restructuring Fund Act, the Covered Bond Act, 
the Financial Stabilization Fund Act, the Credit Institutions Reorganization Act, and the Financial 
Market Stabilization Fund Regulation.  Importantly, it also created the Resolution and Recovery 
Act (Sanierungs and Abwicklungsgesetz (SAG)).   
 
The SAG governs the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms in 
Germany and includes sections on recovery planning, early intervention measures, resolution 
powers and instruments, restructuring plans, and the utilization of deposit guarantee schemes.  The 
Act also established the Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung (FMSA) as the resolution 
authority and Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) or the ECB, where 
appropriate, as the competent supervisory authority.  The FMSA was originally established in 
2008, and in 2015, the FMSA gained additional competencies, including the responsibility of being 
the national resolution authority.22  The Act concentrates the powers of resolution that had been 
previously distributed among a number of agencies in the FMSA.   
 
Although the German law is generally consistent with the content of the BRRD, we list two items 
that could pose some discontinuity in the future if they are not adequately remedied or addressed: 
(a) the organizational structure of the combined FMSA/BaFin agency, and (b) early intervention 
measures and sub-delegation of relevant powers.  Specifically, the Act stipulates that, at some later 
date, the FMSA would be folded into the BaFin.  The Act further states that there would be a clear 
organizational divide between the resolution authority and the supervisory tasks of the BaFin but 
was not explicit about how that division would be accomplished.  Commentary by the ECB notes 
that “it is important to ensure operational independence of the resolution function and to avoid 
conflicts of interest between the resolution function and other functions” (European Central Bank, 
2014).23 With regard to early intervention measures, section 36(4) of the Act grants the Ministry 
of Finance the power to specify certain conditions that could trigger early intervention measures 
and allows the Ministry of Finance to transfer that power.  The ECB notes that this delegation of 
                                                            
22 Draft BRRD implementation Act, page 2. 
23 Opinion of the European Central Bank on 12 September 2014 on the implementation of the European Bank Recovery and 
Directive (CON/2014/67). 
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power “seems inappropriate given that the intervention powers lie with the supervisory authority, 
which would therefore appear best placed to specify the relevant trigger conditions.” 
 
To bring domestic German law in line with the “no creditor worse off” principle of the BRRD, the 
German Resolution Mechanism Act (Abwicklungsmechanismusgesetz – AbwMechG) changed the 
ranking of liabilities in the case of bank insolvency proceedings by amending section 46(f) of the 
German Banking Act (KWG).24 
 
(b) Italy 
 
The Italian government passed two legislative degrees in 2015 to transpose the BRRD into 
domestic law.25  In particular, Legislative Decree No 180 of November 16, 2015, contains the core 
BRRD framework.  It identifies the Bank of Italy as the national resolution authority with powers 
to adopt regulatory measures.  It sets out rules with regard to the preparation of resolution plans, 
resolution powers and tools, the crisis management of cross-border groups, and other matters.  In 
addition, it establishes a national resolution fund (Fondo di Risoluzione Nationale) funded by the 
Italian banking sector and functioning under the management of the Bank of Italy.  
 
Legislative Decree No 181 of December 16, 2015, supplementary to Legislative Decree 180, 
introduces amendments to the then-existing Italian Banking Law26 and to the Italian Financial 
Law27 pertaining to several aspects including but not limited to recovery plans, intra-group 
financial support, and early intervention measures and the hierarchy of creditors in the so-called 
extraordinary administration and compulsory administrative liquidation to bring the Italian law in 
line with the relevant provisions of the BRRD.  To ensure consistency with the scope of application 
of the BRRD, Legislative Decree 181 also regulates the recovery and resolution of certain 
investment firms.  The Legislative Decrees entered into force on 1 January 2015, and the bail-in 
rules entered into force on 1 January 2016.  The Italian legislation is broadly in line with the 
BRRD; however, there are some notable deviations. 
 
                                                            
24 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, ‘Bank resolution: Seniority of liabilities not eligible for bail-in makes insolvency 
proceedings easier’ (Expert Articles, 29/01/2016). 
25 Legislative Decree 180 (16 November 2015) and Legislative Decree 181 (16 November 2015).  Both Decrees were published 
in the Italian Official Gazette on 16 December 2015 and entered into force on the same date subject to certain exceptions, chief 
among which are the rules on bail-in.  The later entered into force on 1 January 2016. 
26 Legislative Decree No 385 of 1 September 1993. 
27 Legislative Degree No 58 of 24 February 1998. 
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The National Resolution Unit was established within the Bank of Italy to facilitate the functions 
of the Bank of Italy as the designated national resolution authority.28  “In order to ensure 
operational independence and to avoid conflicts of interest between the resolution and supervision 
functions, the new unit reports directly to the Governing Board of the Bank of Italy.”  This is in 
line with BRRD Article 3(3); however, before placing an institution into resolution, the Bank of 
Italy must seek and obtain the prior approval from the Italian Ministry of Finance.  As long as the 
proposed resolution measures are not expected to have a direct fiscal impact or systemic 
implications, the approval of the Ministry of Finance is problematic because it renders in effect 
the Ministry of Finance as a second national resolution authority alongside the Bank of Italy.29 
 
In relation to the bail-in tool and the hierarchy of claims, Italian law provides for an extended 
depositor preference regime that, as of 1 January 2019, will also cover large enterprises holding 
uninsured deposits.30  This goes beyond what is strictly required by the BRRD and it may be 
justified as a measure that purports to contain the negative repercussions of a future haircut of 
deposits on the real economy.31  
 
The Bank of Italy acting in its capacity as the national resolution authority may derogate from the 
pari passu principle and, hence, discriminate among creditors belonging to the same class—for 
example, in order to protect the interests of retail bondholders.  The possibility of exercising this 
discretion is of immense practical importance in Italy because, historically, bonds issued by Italian 
banks have been perceived as saving products as much as investment products, and they have been 
massively sold to retail investors.  Legislative Decree 180 allows this sort of derogation only 
exceptionally and only in those circumstances specified in the BRRD.  
 
Recent experience with the handling of failing banks in Italy suggest that the protection of 
household bondholders is a major concern (Merler 2017).  So far, the approach of the Italian 
authorities seems to be to avoid bail-in as much as possible.  For example, the Italian authorities 
did not apply bank resolution law to deal with the failings of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and of 
Veneto Banca.  Instead, they put them into administrative liquidation according to domestic Italian 
                                                            
28 Article 3 of Legislative Decree No 72 (12 May 2015) and Article 8 of Law No. 114 of July 2015 (Legge di delegazione 
europea 2014). 
29 See ECB Opinion of October 16, 2015 on the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, CON 
2015/35, Italy; (16 October 2015).  The involvement of the Ministry of Finance under Greek law also raises similar concerns. 
30 Article 3(9) of Legislative Decree 181.  For a brief commentary, see C. Di Falco, L. Prosperetti, G. Scassellati Sforzolini, 
‘Implementation and first application of BRRD in Italy, (Clearly Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton LLP, Alert Memorandum; 
December 2015) on page 4;  P. Alexander, I. Canino, F. Foscari, L. Graffi, M. Immordino, N. Lasagna and P. Leocani, ‘Italy 
implements the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive’ (White and Case, Client Alert; 4 February 2016) on page 5. 
31 See ‘The implementation of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive in Italy’ (Allen & Overy; 1 October 2015). 
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insolvency law.  Another creative solution to avoid using the bail-in tool, which benefits Italian 
bondholders, was the creation of the Atlas fund.  Atlas is financed by Italian banks and serves as 
a guarantee scheme for nonperforming loans (Giudici, P. and Parisi, L. 2016).  The treatment of 
the troubled Italian bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena also reveals disagreement as to the 
circumstances under which extra ordinary public support, i.e. a precautionary recapitalization, may 
be made available.32  
 
(c) United Kingdom 
 
The current U.K. legal framework for the recovery and resolution of banks dates back to 2009.33  
It was one of the first measures adopted as a response to the financial crisis of 2007.34  The Banking 
Act 2009 stands at the epicenter of this legal framework.35  Since its entry into force, it has been 
the subject of several amendments.  Arguably, the most important set of amendments to the 
Banking Act 2009 were introduced with the Bank Recovery and Resolution Order 2014 (SI 2014 
No 3329), which is the key transposition instrument of the BRRD.36 The Order introduces 
necessary amendments with respect to statutory objectives and resolution triggers as well as new 
pre-resolution powers to the U.K. resolution authorities, including the obligation to write down or 
convert capital instruments before using any stabilization options.  The Order also amends the 
original bail-in powers and alters the procedural rules for the use of stabilization powers.37  
 
The Banking Act 2009 identifies the Bank of England as the leading resolution authority.  The 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) are identified 
as the competent authorities, and Her Majesty's Treasury (HM Treasury) is named as the competent 
Ministry.38  The Bank of England takes decisions about the use of the available recovery and 
                                                            
32 In the case of Monte dei Paschi di Siena, it is argued that Article 32 (4) (d) (iii) could be used for precautionary 
recapitalisations as a form of liquidity support to banks.  On this point see, Veron (2016). 
33 The Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 was the first ever special insolvency regime for banks in the United Kingdom.  It 
eventually lapsed and was replaced by the Banking Act 2009, which is still in force today in adapted form. 
34 With respect to the bail-in tool, it is worth noting that, at the EU level, the deadline for the transposition of the BRRD was 
January 2015, with the transposition of the bail-in tool delayed until 1 January 2016.  The bail-in provisions of the U.K. 
legislation came into effect on 1 January 2015, with the exception of the provisions relating to a Minimum Requirement of 
Eligible Liabilities (MREL). 
35 For a general discussion, see. L Chan Ho, ‘Bank Insolvency Law in the United Kingdom’ in Lastra (2011). 
36 Other legal instruments transposing the BRRD include the Bank and Building Societies (Depositor Preference and Priorities) 
Order 2014, the Banking Act 2009 (Restriction of Special Bail-in Provision etc.) Order 2014, the Banking Act 2009 (Mandatory 
Compensation Arrangements Following Bail-in) Regulations 2014, the Bank Recovery and Resolution (No2) Order 2014, and 
the Building Societies (Bail-in) Order 2014. 
37 The bail-in power was introduced in the United Kingdom by Schedule 2 of the Banking Reform Act 2013.  The latter entered 
into force on 31 December 2014. 
38 As per 1 March 2017, the Bank of England is to act as the PRA through the Prudential Regulation Committee under the Bank 
of England and Financial Services Act 2016 (Commencement No. 4 and Saving Provision) Regulations 2017. 
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resolution tools.  It has the overall responsibility of the implementation of these decisions and, as 
the “resolution authority,” it is endowed with enforcement powers.39  The Bank of England acts 
jointly with the PRA and, where relevant, the FCA.  While the PRA is responsible for banks, the 
FCA is responsible for investment firms.  The role of the PRA and the FCA is to determine whether 
the financial institution in question is failing or likely to fail.  Where resolution measures involve 
the use of public funds, it is for the Treasury to take the final decision.40  
 
The resolution objectives of the U.K. recovery and resolution regime are in line with those laid 
down in the BRRD.41  However, there are some differences in the language used.  The U.K. law 
makes explicit reference to the promotion of public confidence in the stability of the U.K. financial 
system.  Strictly speaking, the “public confidence” objective is not included among the BRRD 
resolution objectives.  Nevertheless, it may be inferred by the BRRD financial stability objective.  
The U.K. legal framework does not set out a separate set of resolution principles akin to the one 
in BBRD Article 34 (General Principles Governing Resolution).  
 
The BRRD requires that Member States have in place resolution financing arrangements for the 
purpose of ensuring the effective application of the resolution tools and powers.  The United 
Kingdom has not established a national resolution fund.  Instead, the existing U.K. bank levy 
system is to be used to meet the ex-ante funding requirements of the BRRD.42  These funds will 
be made available immediately in the event of a resolution provided all other conditions are met 
in view of the fact that the BRRD imposes limits on the use of resolution funds to absorb losses.  
 
The United Kingdom also intends to apply the “no creditor worse off” principle to all liabilities 
affected where a write-down occurs (i.e., irrespective of whether the write-down in mandatory or 
discretionary for the resolution authority) in accordance with section 12AA of the Banking Act 
                                                            
39 Sections 83ZA to 83Z2 of the Banking Act.  Although consistent with the BRRD, there are concerns that this adds institutional 
complexity, creating domestically a ‘triple-peaks’ regulatory system of recovery and resolution. 
40 For example, where the troubled financial institution is to be placed into temporary public ownership. 
41 The resolution objectives are set out in section 4 of the Banking Act 2009.  They are the following: (a) to ensure the continuity 
of banking services in the United Kingdom and of critical functions; (b) to protect and enhance the stability of the United Kingdom’s 
financial systems; (c) to protect and enhance public confidence in the stability of the United Kingdom’s financial systems; (d) to 
protect public funds, which includes reliance on extraordinary public financial support; (e) to protect investors and depositors to 
the extent that they have investments and deposits, which are respectively covered by an investor compensation scheme and a 
deposit guarantee scheme; (f) to protect client assets; and (g) to avoid interfering with property rights in contravention of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998).  On the right to a peaceful 
environment of property, see Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights.  The BRRD objectives 
are the following: (a) to ensure the continuity of critical functions, (b) to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability, (c) 
to protect public funds, (d) to protect insured depositors, and (e) to protect client funds and client assets.  These are set out in BRRD 
Article 31. 
42 Schedule 19 of the Finance Act 2011. 
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2009 (HM Treasury 2015).  The Order provides an additional layer of protection for certain 
liabilities that arise out of derivatives, financial contracts, and qualifying master agreements.  
Nevertheless, a range of claims is left out.  Examples include but are not limited to liabilities in 
relation to an unsecured debt instrument, which is transferable in security; liabilities in relation to 
capital instruments; and liabilities in relation to subordinated debt (Bates 2015). 
 
(d) Greece 
 
As a Eurozone country, Greece participates in the Banking Union and the SRM.  The BRRD was 
transposed into Greek law on 23 July 2015 with the passing of Law 4335/2015 (Kontizas 2015, 
618).  The law consists of 20 chapters that govern the recovery and resolution of all those deposit-
taking institutions (banks) and investment firms that fall within the scope of the BRRD.  By and 
large, these chapters mirror the chapters of the BRRD and cover a wide range of issues including 
the following: (a) recovery and resolution plans; (b) early intervention; (c) resolution objectives 
and tools; (d) powers of resolution agencies; (e) safeguards; (f) resolution funding; and (g) 
procedural matters.  The same legal instrument also amends earlier Greek law with the view of 
harmonizing the domestic legal framework of bank recovery and resolution with the EU legal 
framework (Kontizas 2015, 618).  An example is the introduction of certain amendments to Law 
4261/14 for the purposes of determining the ranking of covered deposits.  Although the Greek law 
is overall consistent with the content of the BRRD, we identify two issues of concern: (a) the 
institutional structure of bank resolution under Greek law, and (b) the need for public funding for 
the full protection of covered deposits.  
 
With regard to the institutional structure, Law 4335/2015 designates the Bank of Greece and the 
Hellenic Capital Market Commission as the designated resolution authorities of credit institutions 
(“banks”) and investment firms, respectively (Kontizas 2015, 618-619).  Furthermore, the law 
stipulates that the Hellenic Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund (HDIGF) shall perform the 
functions of the national resolution fund, but with respect to the resolution of banks only.  The 
Athens Stock Exchange Members’ Guarantee Fund is the national resolution fund for investment 
firms.  
 
The resolution powers of the designated Greek resolution authority are wide in scope and fully 
adhere to those enshrined in the BRRD.  The role of the Ministry of Finance in bank resolution is 
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a controversial feature of Law 4335/2015.43  In exercising their powers—most notably, powers 
associated with the use of the bail-in tool—the Greek national resolution authority does not act 
independently.  It co-decides jointly with the Ministry of Finance.  Although the open-ended 
language of BRRD Article 3(6) seems to offer scope for such a form of decision-making, it allows 
the Ministry of Finance a third seat at the resolution table and puts into doubt the operational 
independence of the process.  
 
Greek Law 4335/2015 introduces a new provision in the existing Law 4261/2014—namely, Article 
145A, which harmonizes the ranking of claims along the lines of BRRD Article.  New Article 
145A transposes into Greek Law the distinction between the covered deposits (under the deposit 
guarantee schemes) and non-covered deposits of physical persons and medium- and small-sized 
enterprises, as this is enshrined in article BRRD 108.  Article 145A(1) also stipulates that certain 
employment claims (notably those emanating from the provision of legal services) come first with 
the claims of the Greek State (where a government stabilization tool has been used) coming second.  
According to this ranking, covered deposits and subrogation claims of the HDGIF come third.  
Furthermore, the priority ranking of the first paragraph of Article 145A applies without prejudice 
to the second paragraph of the same article, which provides a long list of super-priority claims.  
Due to the prolonged crisis of the Greek economy and the vulnerability of the domestic banking 
sector, public funding might be required for the full protection of covered deposits.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The EU legal framework of bank resolution is flexible enough to enable implementation across 
the EU, and in doing so, allows scope for variation.  This scope for variation may, in some cases, 
undermine ongoing efforts to promote global convergence with international standards of best 
practice in bank resolution or result in financial stability risks.  In this paper, we analyze the 
practical implications of the flexibility of the EU legal framework of bank resolution, focusing in 
particular on the BRRD.  
 
We find an aggregate BRRD score greater than 0.8, implying a large degree of consistency 
between the BRRD and the FSB Key Attributes.  That said, preliminary findings suggest that with 
                                                            
43 See Kontizas (2015) on page 618 (noting the role of the Ministry of Finance as one of the deviations) and 619 (noting that the 
‘consent requirements for the exercise of various powers raises the question as to whether the Ministry of Finance is envisaged as 
a ‘de facto’ resolution authority acting in parallel to the officially designated resolution authorities in Greece namely the Bank of 
Greece (for banks) and the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (for investment firms). 
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the exception of Key Attribute 5 (safeguards) and Key Attribute 10 (resolvability assessments), 
where we find the BRRD fully in line with the Key Attributes, there are several areas where the 
BRRD either varies from the FSB Key Attributes or allows variation at the Member State level.  
The majority of these variations point to slight inconsistencies with the FSB recommendations, 
although some variations would likely have a larger impact than others.  
 
Three noteworthy areas of variation pertain to: (a) the scope of the BRRD compared with the 
recommended scope of effective resolution regimes by the FSB Key Attributes; (b) the moratorium 
tools in the BRRD and (c) harmonization of the protection of creditors (creditor hierarchy) in 
insolvency.  
 
On (a), the scope: The BRRD covers a more narrow scope of financial institutions than the Key 
Attributes recommend.  At present, the resolution of financial institutions other than banks and 
certain investment firms depends on the level of comprehensiveness of domestic legal frameworks 
pending progress with regard to other parallel EU initiatives to harmonize the resolution of CCPs 
and insolvency of firms and bring them closer to line with international standards.44  This piece-
by-piece approach to the harmonization process of financial resolution in the EU could be a 
financial stability concern if nonbank G-SIFIs are in need of a swift, well-coordinated, and 
consistent course of cross-jurisdictional action.  On (b) and (c), the EU has proposed an amendment 
that would result in greater harmonization of the BRRD across Member States.  The November 
2016 legislative proposal amending the BRRD would introduce a new moratorium tool in early 
intervention and would modify creditor hierarchy in insolvency and create a new by creating a 
new class of debt instruments.  
 
Other deviations pertain to: (a) the institutional design; (b) the lack of detail with regard to the 
provision, composition, role, and tasks of CMGs (Key Attributes 8 and 9); and (c) the 
comprehensiveness of data requirements (Key Attribute 11).  There are also some other instances 
where the BRRD rules are closer to full consistency, but the minor deviation is deemed to have 
more important practical implications than the high score suggests.  Despite its consistency with 
Key Attribute 7.5, the BRRD’s mutual recognition regime, for example, is not sufficiently robust 
and could result in some uncertainty in cross-border resolution cases.  
                                                            
44 In addition to the BRRD, one needs to note the gradual development of an EU insolvency law framework.  The Winding Up 
Directive covers banks and certain investment firms.  Insurance firms fall within the scope of the Insurers Winding Up Directive, 
which is recast and further amended in Title IV of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 on the taking up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (recast) (OJ 335, 
17.12.2009, p. 1). 
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According to our findings, the SRM Regulation does not greatly enhance consistency scoring.  It 
does enhance the regional (Eurozone) consistency with regard to the implementation of KA 2 
(designation of resolution authority), KA 3 (resolution powers), KA 7 (legal framework conditions 
for cross border cooperation), KA 8 (CMGs), KA 9 (institution-specific cooperation agreements), 
and KA 12 (access to information and information sharing), but not significantly. 
 
On the implementation of the BRRD in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Greece, our 
analysis suggests near full compliance with the letter of the BRRD, although a few uncertainties 
(e.g., the exact scope of the “no creditor worse off” principle in the United Kingdom) and 
vulnerabilities (e.g., Greece) exist that may jeopardize the attainment of the resolution objectives 
without resorting to public funding.  Additionally, the institutional structure and the concomitant 
question of the involvement of the national Minister of Finance on matters of bank resolution seem 
to cut across all four jurisdictions. 
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Annex A:  Table that Matches the FSB Key Attributes with Corresponding BRRD Articles 
 
KA 1: Scope 
 
Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page Number 
The resolution regime extends to any financial institution that could be systemically significant or critical if it fails 
including: 
   
(i) holding companies of a firm 1  
 
Article 1 (1) 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/211 
(ii) non-regulated operational entities within a financial group or conglomerate that are significant to the business of the 
group or conglomerate 
0.5 
(iii) branches of foreign firms 1 
Average: 0.83   
    
Financial market infrastructures (“FMIs”) are subject to resolution regimes that apply the objectives and provisions of the 
Key Attributes in a manner as appropriate to FMIs and their critical role in financial markets. The choice of resolution 
powers is guided by the need to maintain continuity of critical FMI functions. 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
    
The resolution regime requires that at least all domestically incorporated global SIFIs ("G-SIFIs"):    
(i) have in place a recovery and resolution plan (“RRP”), including a group resolution plan, containing all elements set out 
in I-Annex 4. 
1 See Key 
Attribute 11 
 
(ii) are subject to regular resolvability assessments. 1 See Key 
Attribute 10 
 
(iii) are the subject of institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements. 0.5 See Key 
Attribute 9 
 
Average: 0.83   
     
Aggregate KA 1 Index: 0.56   
 
KA 2: Resolution Authority 
 
Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page Number 
Each jurisdiction has a designated administrative authority or authorities responsible for exercising the resolution powers over 
firms within the scope of the resolution regime (“resolution authority”). Where there are multiple resolution authorities within 
a jurisdiction their respective mandates, roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and coordinated. 
 
1 
Article 3 (1) ; 
Article 3(10-
11) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/219; OJ 
2014/59/EU L173/220 
     
Where different resolution authorities are in charge of resolving entities of the same group within a single jurisdiction, the 
resolution regime of that jurisdiction identifies a lead authority that coordinates the resolution of the legal entities within that 
jurisdiction. 
 
0.5 
 
Article 3 (1) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/219 
     
As part of its statutory objectives and functions, and where appropriate in coordination with other authorities, the resolution 
authority: 
    
(i) pursues financial stability and ensures continuity of systemically important financial services as well as the payment, 
clearing, and settlement functions 
1   
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Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page Number 
(ii) protects, where applicable and in coordination with the relevant insurance schemes and arrangements, such depositors, 
insurance policyholders, and investors as are covered by such schemes and arrangements 
1  
 
Article 31 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/248 (iii) avoids unnecessary destruction of value and seeks to minimise the overall costs of resolution in home and host 
jurisdictions and losses to creditors, where that is consistent with the other statutory objectives 
1 
(iv) duly considers the potential impact of its resolution actions on financial stability in other jurisdictions. 1 
Average: 1     
    
The resolution authority has the authority to enter into agreements with resolution authorities of other jurisdictions. 1 Article 93 (1) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/318 
     
The resolution authority has operational independence consistent with its statutory responsibilities, transparent processes, 
sound governance, and adequate resources and is subject to rigorous evaluation and accountability mechanisms to assess the 
effectiveness of any resolution measures. It has the expertise, resources, and operational capacity to implement resolution 
measures with respect to large and complex firms. 
 
1 
 
Article 3 (3, 8, 
9) 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/219 
The resolution authority has the expertise, resources, and operational capacity to implement resolution measures with respect 
to large and complex firms. 
1 Article 3 (8, 9) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/220 
    
The resolution authority and its staff are protected against liability for actions taken and omissions made while discharging 
their duties in the exercise of resolution powers in good faith, including actions in support of foreign resolution proceedings. 
 
0.5 
 
Article 3 (12) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/220 
    
The resolution authority has unimpeded access to firms where that is material for the purposes of resolution planning and the 
preparation and implementation of resolution measures. 
0.5 Article 11 (1) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/230 
     
Aggregate KA 2 Index: 0.81   
 
KA 3. Resolution Powers 
 
Index Based on FSB Text Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page Number 
Resolution is initiated when a firm is no longer viable or likely to be no longer viable and has no reasonable prospect of 
becoming so.  
1 Article 32(1) 
a-b 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/249 
The resolution regime provides for timely and early entry into resolution before a firm is balance-sheet insolvent and before 
all equity has been fully wiped out.  
1 Article 32 (1) 
a-c 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/249 
There are clear standards or suitable indicators of non-viability to help guide decisions on whether firms meet the conditions 
for entry into resolution.  
1 Article 32 (4) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/249 
Average: 1   
    
Resolution authorities have at their disposal a broad range of resolution powers, which include powers to do the following:  Article 63 (1) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/293 
(i) Remove and replace the senior management and directors and recover monies from responsible persons, including claw-
back of variable remuneration 
0.5 Article 63 (1) l OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/294 
(ii) Appoint an administrator to take control of and manage the affected firm with the objective of restoring the firm, or parts 
of its business, to ongoing and sustainable viability 
1 Article 29 (1) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/245 
(iii) Operate and resolve the firm, including powers to terminate contracts, continue or assign contracts, purchase or sell 
assets, write down debt, and take any other action necessary to restructure or wind down the firm’s operations 
 
1 
Article 63 (1) 
b-i 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/293 
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Index Based on FSB Text Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page Number 
(iv) Ensure continuity of essential services and functions by requiring other companies in the same group to continue to 
provide essential services to the entity in resolution, any successor, or an acquiring entity; ensuring that the residual entity in 
resolution can temporarily provide such services to a successor or an acquiring entity; or procuring necessary services from 
unaffiliated third-parties 
 
1 
 
Article 40 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/261 
(v) Override rights of shareholders of the firm in resolution, including requirements for approval by shareholders of 
particular transactions, in order to permit a merger, acquisition, sale of substantial business operations, recapitalization, or 
other measures to restructure and dispose of the firm’s business or its liabilities and assets 
 
1 
Article 63 (1) 
b 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/293 
(vi) Transfer or sell assets and liabilities, legal rights, and obligations, including deposit liabilities and ownership in shares, 
to a solvent third-party, notwithstanding any requirements for consent or novation that would otherwise apply (see Key 
Attribute 3.3) 
 
1 
 
Article 63 (1) c 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/293 
(vii) Establish a temporary bridge institution to take over and continue operating certain critical functions and viable 
operations of a failed firm (see Key Attribute 3.4) 
1 Article 63 (1) 
d 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/293 
(viii) Establish a separate asset management vehicle (for example, as a subsidiary of the distressed firm, an entity with a 
separate charter, or a trust or asset management company) and transfer to the vehicle for management and rundown non-
performing loans or difficult-to-value assets 
 
1 
Article 63 (1) 
d 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/293 
(ix) Carry out bail-in within resolution as a means to achieve or help achieve continuity of essential functions either by (i) 
recapitalising the entity hitherto providing these functions that is no longer viable or (ii) capitalising a newly established 
entity or bridge institution to which these functions have been transferred following closure of the non-viable firm (the 
residual business of which would then be wound up and the firm liquidated) (see Key Attribute 3.5) 
 
 
1 
 
Article 43 (2) 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/267 
(x) Temporarily stay the exercise of early termination rights that may otherwise be triggered upon entry of a firm into 
resolution or in connection with the use of resolution powers (see Key Attribute 4.3 and Annex IV) 
1   
(xi) Impose a moratorium with a suspension of payments to unsecured creditors and customers (except for payments and 
property transfers to central counterparties (CCPs) and those entered into the payment, clearing, and settlements systems) 
and a stay on creditor actions to attach assets or otherwise collect money or property from the firm, while protecting the 
enforcement of eligible netting and collateral agreements 
 
0.5 
  
(xii) Effect the closure and orderly wind-down (liquidation) of the whole or part of a failing firm with timely payout or 
transfer of insured deposits and prompt (for example, within seven days) access to transaction accounts and to segregated 
client funds) 
 
 
1 
 
Article 34 (1) 
h; Article 108; 
Article 109 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/251; OJ 
2014/59/EU L173/330; 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/331 
Average: 0.92   
    
Resolution authorities have the power to transfer selected assets and liabilities of the failed firm to a third-party institution 
or to a newly established bridge institution. 
1 Article 38 (1) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/257 
Any transfer of assets or liabilities should not require the consent of any interested party or creditor to be valid.  
1 
Article 38 
(8,9); Article 
85 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/258; OJ 
2014/59/EU L173/310 
Any transfer of assets or liabilities should not constitute a default or termination event in relation to any obligation relating 
to such assets or liabilities or under any contract to which the failed firm is a party (see Key Attribute 4.2). 
1   
Average: 1   
     
Resolution authorities have the power to establish one or more bridge institutions to take over and continue operating certain 
critical functions and viable operations of a failed firm, including: 
   
(i) the power to enter into legally enforceable agreements by which the authority transfers, and the bridge institution 
receives, assets and liabilities of the failed firm as selected by the authority 
1 Article 40 (1) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/261 
(ii) the power to establish the terms and conditions under which the bridge institution has the capacity to operate as a going 
concern, including the manner under which the bridge institution obtains capital or operational financing and other liquidity 
support; the prudential and other regulatory requirements that apply to the operations of the bridge institution; the selection 
of management and the manner by which the corporate governance of the bridge institution may be conducted; and the 
performance by the bridge institution of such other temporary functions as the authority may from time to time prescribe 
 
 
1 
 
 
Article 41 (1) 
a-d 
 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/263 
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Index Based on FSB Text Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page Number 
(iii) the power to reverse, if necessary, asset and liability transfers to a bridge institution subject to appropriate safeguards, 
such as time restrictions 
1 Article 40 (7) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/261 
(iv) the power to arrange the sale or wind-down of the bridge institution, or the sale of some or all of its assets and liabilities 
to a purchasing institution, so as best to effect the objectives of the resolution authority 
 
1 
 
Article 41  (8) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/263 
Average: 1   
    
Powers to carry out bail-in within resolution enable resolution authorities to:    
(i) write down in a manner that respects the hierarchy of claims in liquidation (see Key Attribute 5.1) equity or other 
instruments of ownership of the firm, unsecured and uninsured creditor claims to the extent necessary to absorb the losses 
 
1 
 
Article 44 (9) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/270 
(ii) convert into equity or other instruments of ownership of the firm under resolution (or any successor in resolution or the 
parent company within the same jurisdiction), all or parts of unsecured and uninsured creditor claims in a manner that 
respects the hierarchy of claims in liquidation 
 
1 
 
Article 48 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/279 
(iii) upon entry into resolution, convert or write-down any contingent convertible or contractual bail-in instruments whose 
terms had not been triggered prior to entry into resolution and treat the resulting instruments in line with (i) or (ii). 
 
1 
  
Average: 1   
    
The resolution regime makes it possible to apply bail-in within resolution in conjunction with other resolution powers (for 
example, removal of problem assets, replacement of senior management, and adoption of a new business plan) to ensure the 
viability of the firm or newly established entity following the implementation of bail-in. 
 
1 
 
Article 63 (1) 
OJ 2014/59/EU L 
173/293 
Average: 1   
    
3.7 In the case of insurance firms, resolution authorities also have the power to:    
(i) undertake a portfolio transfer moving all or part of the insurance business to another insurer without the consent of each 
and every policyholder 
0   
(ii) discontinue the writing of new business by an insurance firm in resolution while continuing to administer existing 
contractual policy obligations for in-force business (run-off) 
0   
Average: 0   
    
3.8 Resolution authorities have the legal and operational capacity to:    
(i) apply one or a combination of resolution powers, with resolution actions being either combined or applied sequentially 1  
 
Article 72 (1-
3) 
 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/301 
(ii) apply different types of resolution powers to different parts of the firm’s business (for example, retail and commercial 
banking, trading operations, insurance) 
1 
(iii) initiate a wind-down for those operations that, in the particular circumstances, are judged by the authorities to be not 
critical to the financial system or the economy (see Key Attribute 3.2 xii) 
1 
Average: 1   
    
3.9 In applying resolution powers to individual components of a financial group located in its jurisdiction, the resolution 
authority should take into account the impact on the group as a whole and on financial stability in other affected 
jurisdictions, and undertake best efforts to avoid taking actions that could reasonably be expected to trigger instability 
elsewhere in the group or in the financial system. 
1  
Article 3 (7) 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/220 
Average: 1   
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Index Based on FSB Text Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page Number 
Aggregate KA 3 Index: 0.88   
 
 
4. Set-Off, Netting, Collateralization, Segregation of Client Assets 
 
Index Based on FSB Text: Score BRRD 
Citation 
BRRD Page Number 
The legal framework governing set-off rights, contractual netting, and collateralization agreements and the segregation of 
client assets is clear, transparent, and enforceable during a crisis or resolution of firms and does not hamper the effective 
implementation of resolution measures. 
 
1 
 
Article 77 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/304 
    
Subject to adequate safeguards, entry into resolution and the exercise of any resolution powers does not trigger statutory or 
contractual set-off rights, or constitute an event that entitles any counterparty of the firm in resolution to exercise contractual 
acceleration or early termination rights provided the substantive obligations under the contract continue to be performed. 
 
1 
 
Article 68 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/297 
    
Should contractual acceleration or early termination rights nevertheless be exercisable, the resolution authority has the 
power to stay temporarily such rights where they arise by reason only of entry into resolution or in connection with the 
exercise of any resolution powers. The stay: 
   
(i) is strictly limited in time (for example, for a period not exceeding 2 business days)  
0.5 
 
Article 69; 
Article 70 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/299; OJ 
2014/59/EU L173/299 
(ii) is subject to adequate safeguards that protect the integrity of financial contracts and provide certainty to counterparties 
(see I-Annex 5 on Conditions for a temporary stay) 
 
0.5 
 
Article 71 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/299 
(iii) does not affect the exercise of early termination rights of a counterparty against the firm being resolved in the case of 
any event of default not related to entry into resolution or the exercise of the relevant resolution power occurring before, 
during, or after the period of the stay (for example, failure to make a payment, deliver or return collateral on a due date) 
 
0.5 
Article 69; 
Article 70 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/299; OJ 
2014/59/EU L173/299 
Average: 0.5   
    
The jurisdiction ensures clarity both on the beginning and the end of the stay and whether the stay is discretionary (imposed 
by the resolution authority) or automatic in operation. 
0.5   
    
Average: 0.5   
     
Aggregate KA 4 Index: 0.75   
 
5. Safeguards 
 
Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD 
Citation 
BRRD Page Number 
Resolution powers are exercised in a way that respects the hierarchy of claims while providing flexibility to depart from the 
general principle of equal (pari passu) treatment of creditors of the same class, with transparency about the reasons for such 
departures, if necessary to contain the potential systemic impact of a firm’s failure or to maximise the value for the benefit 
of all creditors as a whole. In particular, equity absorbs losses first, and no loss is imposed on senior debt holders until 
subordinated debt (including all regulatory capital instruments) has been written-off entirely (whether or not that loss-
absorption through write-down is accompanied by conversion to equity). 
 
 
1 
 
 
Preamble (77); 
Article 48 (1) 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/202; OJ 
2014/59/EU L173/279 
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Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD 
Citation 
BRRD Page Number 
Creditors have a right to compensation where they do not receive at a minimum what they would have received in a 
liquidation of the firm under the applicable insolvency regime (“no creditor worse off than in liquidation” safeguard). 
 
1 
Article 73; 
Article 75 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/301; OJ 
2014/59/EU L173/302 
    
Directors and officers of the firm under resolution are protected in law (for example, from lawsuits by shareholders or 
creditors) for actions taken when complying with decisions of the resolution authority. 
 
1 
Article 40 
(12); Article 
42(13) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/263; OJ 
2014/59/EU L173/266 
Average: 1.00   
    
The resolution authority has the capacity to exercise the resolution powers with the necessary speed and flexibility, subject 
to constitutionally protected legal remedies and due process. In those jurisdictions where a court order is still required to 
apply resolution measures, resolution authorities take this into account in the resolution planning process so as to ensure that 
the time required for court proceedings will not compromise the effective implementation of resolution measures. 
 
 
1 
  
    
The legislation establishing resolution regimes does not provide for judicial actions that could constrain the implementation 
of, or result in a reversal of, measures taken by resolution authorities acting within their legal powers and in good faith. 
Instead, it provides for redress by awarding compensation, if justified. 
 
 
1 
  
    
In order to preserve market confidence, jurisdictions provide for flexibility to allow temporary exemptions from disclosure 
requirements or a postponement of disclosures required by the firm—for example, under market reporting, takeover 
provisions, and listing rules, where the disclosure by the firm could affect the successful implementation of resolution 
measures. 
 
 
1 
 
Article 39 (2); 
Article 17 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/260; EU 
Regulation 596/2014 
Average: 1.00   
     
Aggregate KA 5 Index: 1.00   
 
6. Funding of Firms in Resolution 
 
Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD 
Citation 
BRRD Page Number 
Jurisdictions have statutory or other policies in place so that authorities are not constrained to rely on public ownership or 
bail-out funds as a means of resolving firms. 
0.5   
    
Where temporary sources of funding to maintain essential functions are needed to accomplish orderly resolution, the 
resolution authority, or authority extending the temporary funding, there is a provision to recover any losses incurred (i) 
from shareholders and unsecured creditors subject to the “no creditor worse off than in liquidation” safeguard or (ii) if 
necessary, from the financial system more widely. 
 
1 
 
Article 101 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/315 
    
Jurisdiction has in place privately financed deposit insurance or resolution funds, or a funding mechanism with ex-post 
recovery from the industry of the costs of providing temporary financing to facilitate the resolution of the firm. 
1 Article 100 (1-
4) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/270 
    
Any provision by the authorities of temporary funding is subject to strict conditions that minimise the risk of moral hazard 
and include the following: 
   
(i) a determination that the provision of temporary funding is necessary to foster financial stability and will permit 
implementation of a resolution option that is best able to achieve the objectives of an orderly resolution, and that private 
sources of funding have been exhausted or cannot achieve these objectives 
 
1 
Article 32 (1) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/249 
(ii) the allocation of losses to equity holders and residual costs, as appropriate, to unsecured and uninsured creditors and the 
industry through ex-post assessments, insurance premium, or other mechanisms. 
1 Article 104 (1) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/327 
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Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD 
Citation 
BRRD Page Number 
Average: 1   
    
As a last resort and for the overarching purpose of maintaining financial stability, some countries may decide to have a 
power to place the firm under temporary public ownership and control in order to continue critical operations while seeking 
to arrange a permanent solution such as a sale or merger with a commercial private sector purchaser. Where countries do 
equip themselves with such powers, there is a provision to recover any losses incurred by the state from unsecured creditors 
or, if necessary, the financial system more widely. 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
Articles 56-58 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/287 
Average: 0.5   
     
Aggregate KA 6 Index: 0.80   
 
7. Legal Framework Conditions for Cross-Border Cooperation 
 
Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD 
Citation 
BRRD Page Number 
The statutory mandate of a resolution authority empowers and strongly encourages the authority wherever possible to act to 
achieve a cooperative solution with foreign resolution authorities. 
1 Article 87 a-d OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/311 
    
Legislation and regulations in jurisdictions do not contain provisions that trigger automatic action in that jurisdiction as a 
result of official intervention or the initiation of resolution or insolvency proceedings in another jurisdiction, while reserving 
the right of discretionary national action if necessary to achieve domestic stability in the absence of effective international 
cooperation and information sharing. Where a resolution authority takes discretionary national action it considers the impact 
on financial stability in other jurisdictions. 
 
 
1 
 
 
Article 87 e-l 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/311 
    
The resolution authority has resolution powers over local branches of foreign firms and the capacity to use its powers either 
to support a resolution carried out by a foreign home authority (for example, by ordering a transfer of property located in its 
jurisdiction to a bridge institution established by the foreign home authority) or, in exceptional cases, to take measures on its 
own initiative where the home jurisdiction is not taking action or acts in a manner that does not take sufficient account of 
the need to preserve the local jurisdiction’s financial stability. Where a resolution authority acting as host authority takes 
discretionary national action, it gives prior notification and consults the foreign home authority. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
Article 87 
 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/311 
    
National laws and regulations do not discriminate against creditors on the basis of their nationality, the location of their 
claim, or the jurisdiction where it is payable.  The treatment of creditors and ranking in insolvency is transparent and 
properly disclosed to depositors, insurance policyholders, and other creditors. 
 
0.5 
 
Preamble (13) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/192 
    
Jurisdiction provides for transparent and expedited processes to give effect to foreign resolution measures, either by way of 
a mutual recognition process or by taking measures under the domestic resolution regime that support and are consistent 
with the resolution measures taken by the foreign home resolution authority. Such recognition or support measures enable a 
foreign home resolution authority to gain rapid control over the firm (branch or shares in a subsidiary) or its assets that are 
located in the host jurisdiction, as appropriate, in cases where the firm is being resolved under the law of the foreign home 
jurisdiction. Recognition or support of foreign measures is provisional on the equitable treatment of creditors in the foreign 
resolution proceeding. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Article 90 
 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/315 
    
The resolution authority has the capacity in law, subject to adequate confidentiality requirements and protections for 
sensitive data, to share information, including recovery and resolution plans (RRPs), pertaining to the group as a whole or to 
individual subsidiaries or branches, with relevant foreign authorities (for example, members of a CMG), where sharing is 
necessary for recovery and resolution planning or for implementing a coordinated resolution. 
 
1 
 
Article 98 (1-
2) 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/323 
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Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD 
Citation 
BRRD Page Number 
Jurisdictions provide for confidentiality requirements and statutory safeguards for the protection of information received 
from foreign authorities. 
1 Article 84 OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/308 
Aggregate KA 7 Index: 
 
0.93 
 
  
    
 
8. Crisis Management Groups (CMGs) 
 
Index Based on FSB Text Score: BRRD 
Citation 
BRRD Page Number 
Home and key host authorities of all G-SIFIs maintain CMGs with the objective of enhancing preparedness for, and 
facilitating the management and resolution of, a cross-border financial crisis affecting the firm. CMGs include the 
supervisory authorities, central banks, resolution authorities, finance ministries, and public authorities responsible for 
guarantee schemes of jurisdictions that are home or host to entities of the group that are material to its resolution, and 
cooperate closely with authorities in other jurisdictions where firms have a systemic presence. 
 
0.5 
 
 
Article 97 (5) 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/322 
    
CMGs keep under active review and report as appropriate to the FSB and the FSB Peer Review Council on:    
(i) progress in coordination and information sharing within the CMGs and with host authorities that are not represented in 
the CMGs 
0   
(ii) the recovery and resolution planning process for G-SIFIs under institution-specific cooperation agreements 0.5   
(iii) the resolvability of G-SIFIs 0   
Average: 0.17   
     
Aggregate KA 8 Index: 0.33   
 
9. Institution-Specific Cross-Border Cooperation Agreements 
 
Index Based on FSB Text Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page 
Number 
For all G-SIFIs, at a minimum, institution-specific cooperation agreements are in place between the home and relevant 
host authorities that need to be involved in the planning and crisis resolution stages. These agreements, inter alia: 
   
(i) establish the objectives and processes for cooperation through CMGs 0.5 Article 97 (5) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/322 
(ii) define the roles and responsibilities of the authorities pre-crisis (that is, in the recovery and resolution planning 
phases) and during a crisis 
1 Article 88 (1-6) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/312 
(iii) set out the process for information sharing before and during a crisis, including sharing with any host authorities that 
are not represented in the CMG, with clear reference to the legal basis for information sharing in the respective national 
laws and to the arrangements that protect the confidentiality of the shared information 
 
1 
 
Article 90; Article 
98 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/315; OJ 
2014/59/EU 
L173/323 
(iv) set out the processes for coordination in the development of the RRPs for the firm, including parent or holding 
company and significant subsidiaries, branches, and affiliates that are within the scope of the agreement, and for 
engagement with the firm as part of this process 
 
1 
 
Article 10 (1) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/231 
(v) set out the processes for coordination among home and host authorities in the conduct of resolvability assessments  
1 
 OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/231; OJ 
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Index Based on FSB Text Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page 
Number 
Article 15 (1-4); 
Article 127 
2014/59/EU 
L173/341 
(vi) include agreed-upon procedures for the home authority to inform and consult host authorities in a timely manner 
when there are material adverse developments affecting the firm and before taking any significant action or crisis 
measures 
0.5  
Article 90 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/315 
(vii) include agreed-upon procedures for the host authority to inform and consult the home authority in a timely manner 
when there are material adverse developments affecting the firm and before taking any discretionary action or crisis 
measure 
0.5 
(viii) provide an appropriate level of detail with regard to the cross-border implementation of specific resolution 
measures, including with respect to the use of bridge institution and bail-in powers 
0.5   
(ix) provide for meetings to be held at least annually, involving top officials of the home and relevant host authorities, to 
review the robustness of the overall resolution strategy for G-SIFIs 
0.5 Article 10 (6) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/228 
(x) provide for regular (at least annual) reviews by appropriate senior officials of the operational plans implementing the 
resolution strategies 
 
1 
 
Article 5 (2); 
Article 10 (6) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/223; OJ 
2014/59/EU  
L173/228 
Average: 0.75   
    
The existence of agreements are made public. Note: the home authorities may publish the broad structure of the 
agreements, if agreed-upon by the authorities that are party to the agreement. 
 
1 
Article 88 (1) a-g; 
Article 26 (1) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/312; OJ 
2014/59/EU 
L173/244 
Average: 1   
     
Aggregate KA 9 Index: 0.88   
 
10. Resolvability Assessments 
 
Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page 
Number 
Resolution authorities regularly undertake, at least for G-SIFIs, resolvability assessments that evaluate the feasibility of 
resolution strategies and their credibility in light of the likely impact of the firm’s failure on the financial system and the 
overall economy. Those assessments are conducted in accordance with the guidance set out in I-Annex 3. 
 
1 
 
Preamble (21); 
Article 15 (1) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/194; OJ 
2014/59/EU 
L173/234 
    
In undertaking resolvability assessments, resolution authorities in coordination with other relevant authorities assess, in 
particular: 
   
(i) the extent to which critical financial services, and payment, clearing, and settlement functions can continue to be 
performed 
1  
Annex: Section C 
(1-28) 
 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/346 
(ii) the nature and extent of intra-group exposures and their impact on resolution if they need to be unwound 1 
(iii) the capacity of the firm to deliver sufficiently detailed, accurate, and timely information to support resolution 1 
(iv) the robustness of cross-border cooperation and information sharing arrangements 1 
Average: 1   
    
Group resolvability assessments are conducted by the home authority of the G-SIFI and coordinated within the firm’s 
CMG taking into account national assessments by host authorities. 
1 Article 13 (4) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/233 
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Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page 
Number 
Host resolution authorities that conduct resolvability assessments of subsidiaries located in their jurisdiction coordinate 
as far as possible with the home authority that conducts resolvability assessment for the group as a whole. 
1 Article 13 (4) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/233 
    
To improve a firm’s resolvability, supervisory authorities or resolution authorities have the power to require, where 
necessary, the adoption of appropriate measures, such as changes to a firm’s business practices, structure, or organization 
to reduce the complexity and costliness of resolution, duly taking into account the effect on the soundness and stability of 
ongoing business. To enable the continued operations of systemically important functions, authorities evaluate whether 
to require that these functions be segregated in legally and operationally independent entities that are shielded from 
group problems. 
 
 
1 
 
 
Article 17 (4-5) a-
k 
 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/236 
Aggregate KA 10 Index: 1   
 
11. Recovery and Resolution Planning 
 
Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page 
Number 
Jurisdictions put in place an ongoing process for recovery and resolution planning, covering at a minimum domestically 
incorporated firms that could be systemically significant or critical if they fail. 
1 Article 4 (1-6) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/221 
    
Jurisdictions require that robust and credible RRPs, containing the essential elements of Recovery and Resolution Plans 
set out in I-Annex 4, are in place for all G-SIFIs and for any other firm that its home authority assesses could have an 
impact on financial stability in the event of its failure. 
 
1 
 
Article 5 (1) 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU L 
173/223 
    
The RRP is informed by resolvability assessments (see Key Attribute 10) and takes account of the specific circumstances 
of the firm and reflect its nature, complexity, interconnectedness, level of substitutability, and size. 
1 Article 6 (1-5) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/224 
    
Jurisdictions require that the firm’s senior management be responsible for providing the necessary input to the resolution 
authorities for (i) the assessment of the recovery plans and (ii) the preparation by the resolution authority of resolution 
plans. 
 
1 
  
Average: 1   
     
Supervisory and resolution authorities ensure that the firms for which a RRP is required maintain a recovery plan that 
identifies options to restore financial strength and viability when the firm comes under severe stress. Recovery plans 
include: 
   
(i) credible options to cope with a range of scenarios including both idiosyncratic and marketwide stress 1 Article 5 (1-10) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/223 
(ii) scenarios that address capital shortfalls and liquidity pressures 1 Annex: Section A 
(1-4) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/344 
(iii) processes to ensure timely implementation of recovery options in a range of stress situations 1 Article 5 (1-10) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/223 
Average: 1   
    
The resolution plan is intended to facilitate the effective use of resolution powers to protect systemically important 
functions, with the aim of making the resolution of any firm feasible without severe disruption and without exposing 
taxpayers to loss. It includes a substantive resolution strategy agreed to by top officials and an operational plan for its 
implementation and identify, in particular: 
   
(i) financial and economic functions for which continuity is critical 1  
 
 
Article 10 (1-9) 
 
 
 
(ii) suitable resolution options to preserve those functions or wind them down in an orderly manner 1 
(iii) data requirements on the firm’s business operations, structures, and systemically important functions 0.5 
(iv) potential barriers to effective resolution and actions to mitigate those barriers 1 
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Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page 
Number 
(v) actions to protect insured depositors and insurance policyholders and ensure the rapid return of segregated client 
assets 
0.5 OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/229 
(vi) clear options or principles for the exit from the resolution process 0 
Average: 0.67   
    
Firms are required to ensure that key Service Level Agreements can be maintained in crisis situations and in resolution, 
and that the underlying contracts include provisions that prevent termination triggered by recovery or resolution events 
and facilitate transfer of the contract to a bridge institution or a third-party acquirer. 
 
1 
Annex: Section B 
(13-15); Annex: 
Section C (5-6, 
19) 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/345; OJ 
2014/59/EU 
L173/347 
    
At least for G-SIFIs, the home resolution authority leads the development of the group resolution plan in coordination 
with all members of the firm’s CMG. Host authorities that are involved in the CMG or are the authorities of jurisdictions 
where the firm has a systemic presence should be given access to RRPs and the information and measures that would 
have an impact on their jurisdiction. 
 
0 
  
    
Host resolution authorities may maintain their own resolution plans for the firm’s operations in their jurisdictions, 
cooperating with the home authority to ensure that the plan is as consistent as possible with the group plan. 
1   
Average: 0.67   
        
Supervisory and resolution authorities ensure that RRPs are updated regularly, at least annually or when there are 
material changes to a firm’s business or structure, and subject to regular reviews within the firm’s CMG. 
1 Article 5 (1-2) OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/223 
    
The substantive resolution strategy for each G-SIFI is subject, at least annually, to a review by top officials of home and 
relevant host authorities and, where appropriate, the review should involve the firm’s CEO. The operational plans for 
implementing each resolution strategy is, at least annually, reviewed by appropriate senior officials of the home and 
relevant host authorities. 
 
0.5 
 
 
Article 6 (1-8) 
 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/224 If resolution authorities are not satisfied with a firm’s RRP, the authorities require appropriate measures to address the 
deficiencies. Relevant home and host authorities provide for prior consultation on the actions contemplated. 
1 
Average: 0.83   
     
Aggregate KA 11 Index: 0.88   
 
12. Access to Information and Information Sharing 
 
Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page 
Number 
Jurisdictions ensure that no legal, regulatory, or policy impediments exist that hinder the appropriate exchange of 
information, including firm-specific information, between supervisory authorities, central banks, resolution authorities, 
finance ministries, and the public authorities responsible for guarantee schemes. In particular: 
   
(i) the sharing of all information relevant for recovery and resolution planning and for resolution should be possible in 
normal times and during a crisis at a domestic and a cross-border level 
 
1 
 
Article 90 (1-4) 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/35 
(ii) the procedures for the sharing of information relating to G-SIFIs should be set out in institution-specific cooperation 
agreements (see Annex I) 
 
0.5 
  
(iii) where appropriate and necessary to respect the sensitive nature of information, information sharing may be restricted 
but should be possible among the top officials of the relevant home and host authorities 
 
1 
 
Article 98 (1-3) 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/323 
Average: 0.83   
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Index Based on FSB Text: Score: BRRD Citation BRRD Page 
Number 
    
Jurisdictions require firms to maintain Management Information Systems (MIS) that are able to produce information on a 
timely basis, both in normal times for recovery and resolution planning and in resolution. Information is available at the 
group level and the legal entity level (taking into account information needs under different resolution scenarios, 
including the separation of individual entities from the group). Firms are required, in particular, to: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex: Section B 
(1-21) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OJ 2014/59/EU 
L173/345 
(i) maintain a detailed inventory, including a description and the location of the key MIS used in their material legal 
entities, mapped to their core services and critical functions 
 
1 
(ii) identify and address exogenous legal constraints on the exchange of management information among the constituent 
entities of a financial group (for example, as regarding the information flow from individual entities of the group to the 
parent) 
 
 
1 
(iii) demonstrate, as part of the recovery and resolution planning process, that they are able to produce the essential 
information needed to implement such plans within a short period of time (for example, 24 hours) 
 
1 
(iv) maintain specific information at a legal entity level, including, for example, information on intra-group guarantees 
and intra-group trades booked on a back-to-back basis 
 
1 
Average: 1.00   
    
Aggregate KA 12 Index: 0.92   
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Aggregate Resolution Regime Index: 
Aggregate KA 1 Index 0.56 
Aggregate KA 2 Index 0.81 
Aggregate KA 3 Index 0.88 
Aggregate KA 4 Index 0.75 
Aggregate KA 5 Index 1.00 
Aggregate KA 6 Index 0.80 
Aggregate KA 7 Index 0.93 
Aggregate KA 8 Index 0.33 
Aggregate KA 9 Index 0.88 
Aggregate KA 10 Index 1.00 
Aggregate KA 11 Index 0.88 
Aggregate KA 12 Index 0.92 
Total Index (Average of KAs) 0.81 
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Annex B: The FSB Key Attributes  
 
The Key Attributes further define an effective resolution regime, “interacting with applicable 
schemes and arrangements for the protection of depositors, insurance policyholders and retail 
investors” (page 3) as having the following qualities: 
 
(i) ensure continuity of systemically important financial services, and 
payment, clearing and settlement functions; 
(ii) protect, where applicable and in coordination with the relevant insurance 
schemes and arrangements such depositors, insurance policyholders and 
investors as are covered by such schemes and arrangements, and ensure 
the rapid return of segregated client assets; 
(iii) allocate losses to firm owners (shareholders) and unsecured and uninsured 
creditors in a manner that respects the hierarchy of claims; 
(iv) not rely on public solvency support and not create an expectation that such 
support will be available; 
(v) avoid unnecessary destruction of value, and therefore seek to minimize the 
overall costs of resolution in home and host jurisdictions and, where 
consistent with the other objectives, losses for creditors; 
(vi) provide for speed and transparency and as much predictability as possible 
through legal and procedural clarity and advanced planning for orderly 
resolution; 
(vii) provide a mandate in law for cooperation, information exchange and 
coordination domestically and with relevant foreign resolution authorities 
before and during a resolution; 
(viii) ensure that non-viable firms can exit the market in an orderly way; and 
(ix) be credible, and thereby enhance market discipline and provide incentives 
for market-based solutions.” 
 
The Key Attributes continue (page 3) that: “Jurisdictions should have in place a resolution 
regime that provides the resolution authority with a broad range of powers and options to 
resolve a firm that is no longer viable and has no reasonable prospect of becoming so.  The 
resolution regime should include: 
 
(i) stabilization options that achieve continuity of systemically important functions by 
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way of a sale or transfer of the shares in the firm or of all or parts of the firm’s 
business to a third-party, either directly or through a bridge institution, and/or an 
officially mandated creditor-financed recapitalization of the entity that continues 
providing the critical functions; and 
(ii) liquidation options that provide for the orderly closure and wind-down of all or 
parts of the firm’s business in a manner that protects insured depositors, insurance 
policy holders and other retail customers.” 
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Annex C: The Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation and its Impact on the Findings of 
the Consistency Index 
 
(a) Impact with Regard to Level of Regional Consistency with KA 2 (designation of 
resolution authority) 
 
The SRB has the overall responsibility for the effective and consistent function of the SRM.  The 
function of the SRM is based on a division of tasks between the SRB and national resolution 
authorities of participating Member States.45  The SRB is directly responsible for the resolution of 
“systemically significant” banks.  The national resolution authorities are also involved, but their 
role is ancillary.  In particular, national resolution authorities contribute to the drafting of 
resolution plans and to the preparation and execution of resolution schemes adopted by the SRB.  
The resolution of less systemically significant banks falls within the remit of national resolution 
authorities.  This rule is subject to certain exceptions as, for example, when the SRF is to be used.46  
Accordingly, the more streamlined process of bank resolution of the SRM Regulation enhances 
consistency with KA 2 only with regard to instances of bank resolution that fall under the direct 
authority of the SRB. 
 
With regard to consistency with KA 2.6, Article 80 of the SRM Regulation provides that Protocol 
No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the TEU and the TFEU 
shall apply to the Board and its staff.  Compared to BRRD Article 3(12), Article 80 of the SRM 
Regulation is to be welcomed because it ensures greater certainty about the exact level of legal 
protection and, hence, it is more in line with KA 2.6.  The liability of the SRB with regard to the 
execution of its decisions by national resolution authorities is dealt with separately and in particular 
in Article 87, which is far less permissive and far more detailed in its content compared with its 
BRRD equivalent.  
 
(b) Impact with Regard to Level of Regional Consistency with KA 3 (resolution powers) 
 
                                                            
45 The division of tasks in the SRM is set out in Article 7 SRM Regulation and it replicates the division of tasks in the SSM.  See 
also Georgosouli (2016, 357-358). 
46 See SRM Regulation Article 7(3) (where the SRB replaces national resolution authorities in adopting the resolution scheme for 
the resolution of medium or small size banks).  The SRB also takes leadership for the purposes of ensuring consistent application 
with ‘high resolution standards’ as per SRM Regulation Article 7 (4) (b) or when Member States decide that the SRB shall 
exercise all relevant powers and responsibilities (SRM Regulation Article 7 (5)). 
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The SRB is endowed with the same resolution powers as national resolution authorities as well as 
additional powers to mark the fact that the SRB has the leadership and overall responsibility of the 
functioning of the SRM in the Banking Union as, for example, the power to give instructions with 
regard to the execution of a resolution scheme.47  According to our findings, the streamlined 
procedure of the SRM is likely to be instrumental to the speediness of decision making with regard 
to the resolution of systemically significant banks albeit not necessarily to its timely execution, 
hence resulting in higher consistency with KA 3 in the Banking Union.48  This observation comes 
with a caveat.  The procedure for the adoption of the resolution scheme by the SRB is notoriously 
cumbersome involving inter alia the Commission, the Council, and the ECB but nevertheless 
subject to formidably strict time limits.  It must last no longer than 24 hours or at most 32 hours (8 
hours being the period for the SRB to modify the scheme in response to objections by the 
Commission and the Council if any).49  The strict time limit warranties the speediness of decision-
making.  The quality of decisions reached, however, will be contingent to the preparatory work 
during the stages of supervision and early intervention.  The SRB relies on national resolution 
authorities for the execution of the resolution scheme, but national resolution authorities are not 
left entirely on their own.50  The SRB has the power to give instructions to national resolution 
authorities, start investigations, and even take enforcement action to overcome problems, although 
these powers are very limited in scope. 
 
(c) Impact with Regard to Level of Regional Consistency with KA 7 (legal framework 
conditions for cross-border cooperation),  KA 8 (CMGs) and KA 9 (institution-
specific cross-border cooperation agreements) 
 
According to our findings, the SRM Regulation increases the level of regional consistency with 
KA 9 and, by implication, KA 8.  With regard to the resolution of groups with entities established 
in participating and non-participating Member States, the SRM Regulation provides that national 
                                                            
47 Article 29 of SRM Regulation mandates national resolution authorities to take any necessary action for the implementation of 
SRB decisions.  In its turn, the SRB can issue guidelines and general instructions, request information, carry out investigations 
and on-site inspections, give instructions, and issue warnings.  See SRM Regulation Articles, 28, 31 (1) (a)-(b), 34, 35, 36, 37. 
For a more detailed discussion see Georgosouli (2016, 357-358). 
48 National resolution authorities remain directly responsible for the resolution of less systemic banks, and the timeliness of the 
resolution will pretty much depend on national law subject to further rules and guidelines coming from the EBA. See Article 7 
(3) SRM Regulation. 
49 See Article 18 of SRM Regulation.  The Commission exercises excessive power on the endorsement of the SRB resolution 
scheme.  Contrast here with the Commission’s proposal.  Originally, it was proposed that the SRB should be the last supranational 
“arbiter” over the resolution procedure (see the Commission’s Proposal article 20 and Explanatory Memorandum 4.1.5.).  The 
Council may reject the resolution scheme if, in the opinion of the Council, it is against the public interest but this problem is likely 
to arise as long as the Commission decides to get the Council involved. 
50 SRM Regulation Article 29(1). 
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resolution authorities shall be represented by the SRB for the purposes of cooperation and 
consultation with non-participating Member States or third countries.  Similarly, where a group 
includes entities established in participating Member States and subsidiaries established or 
significant branches located in non-participating Member States, the SRB shall communicate any 
plans, decisions, or measures relevant to the group.51  The representation of national resolution 
authorities by the SRB reduces the number of resolution authorities participating at the college 
level.  It simplifies the process and, where appropriate, can be instrumental to the taking of a joint 
course of action.  
 
Moreover, Article 33(1) SRM Regulation endows the SRB with the power to assess and make 
recommendations as to the recognition and enforcement of third-country resolution proceedings.  
These recommendations are addressed to national resolution authorities of participating Member 
States, which in their turn must either implement them or deviate, providing reasons justifying the 
case for taking a separate course of action.52  The requirement to give reasons is likely to enhance 
policy coherence and greater transparency in the recognition and enforcement of foreign resolution 
proceedings in the Banking Union. 
 
(d) Impact with Regard to Level of Regional Consistency with KA 12 (access to 
information and information sharing):  
 
See above KA 2.7. 
  
                                                            
51 Article 32 SRM Regulation and recital 91 of the Preamble to SRM Regulation. 
52 Recommendations are not legally binding.  See, however, T. Tridimas (2012, 71) (arguing in relation to the European 
Securities and Markets Authority that recommendations represent the heavy hand of soft law).  For further discussion in the 
context of EU bank resolution see Georgosouli (2016). 
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